So You Say You Want a Revolution
A Game Theoretic Explanation of Revolution in Repressive Regimes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283375 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Ginkel (Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis), Alastair Smith (0000-0002-5291-1442, Yale University) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 291-316 |
| Publication date | 1999-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002799043003002 |
| OpenAlex | W2103451908 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 59 |
| References cited | 19 |
Existing models of revolutions tend to focus only on the behavior of the revolutionaries and do not account for government actions. This article presents a model that captures the decision making of a repressive government, career dissidents, and revolutionary participants. The model shows that (a) governments rarely offer concessions to protesters, (b) dissident activity is more likely to be successful in motivating large-scale protest under highly repressive conditions, and (c) Kuran's hypothesis that regimes collapse suddenly with little warning is confirmed. The authors use the model to interpret the different outcomes that occurred during the successful Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and the failed revolution in China during the Tiananmen Square democracy protests
China · Democracy · Focus (optics · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance
Concessions and Protest Demobilization
The Historical Roots of Political Violence
Weak central government, strong legal rights
Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War
Freedom, diversity and the taste for revolt
Optimal Size of Rebellions
Elections, Protest, and Authoritarian Regime Stability
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships
Structuring Conflict in the Arab World
When Will an Authoritarian Regime Concede? A Framework for Strategic Campaigning through Issue Selection and Framing
A game theory model of terrorist mobilization
U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China
The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict
Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective
The recurrence of terrorism
Myopic Government and Strategic Rebels
Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising 1
Fragmented Sovereignty
The Status of Likelihood Claims in International Relations and Peace Science
Institutional Change as a Response to Unrealized Threats
The forgotten protest dynamics
Geography and the outcomes of civil resistance and civil war
Revolutions and rational choice
Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes
Revolutionary leaders and the punishment of critics
Modelos de dinámicas de la opinión. Una revisión de la literatura
Rebel Tactics
Expansion of rebellion
Explaining Variance; Or, Stuck in a Moment We Can't Get Out Of
Revolutionary Dreams and Terrorist Violence in the Developed World
Censoring the Press
Explaining left wing terrorist behaviour – the missing link between terrorist tactics and mass mobilization in anarchist and Marxist-Leninist terrorist thinking
International Pressure, State Repression, and the Spread of Protest
Executive Constraints and Repression in Democratic Contexts
Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Participation and boycott in authoritarian elections
Why Do People Join Backlash Protests? Lessons from Turkey
The Patron’s Dilemma
Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences
Preemptive Repression
Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation
How Civilian Loyalties Shape Rebel-Led Victimization of Rebel Constituencies
Sanctions and Signals
Reneging and the subversion of protest-driven policy change in autocracies
The Authoritarian Wager
Pulling the Strings? The Strategic Use of Pro-Government Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes
Military Conscription and Nonviolent Resistance
Signals of Support From Great Power Patrons and the Use of Repression During Nonviolent Protests
State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes
The Propaganda of the Deed
Leader Survival and Natural Disasters
Economic Opportunities, Emigration and Exit Prisoners
Fraternisation and repression during the 2020–2021 attempted revolution in Belarus
Beliefs, strategic interaction, and Hong Kong's anti-extradition law movement
Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
Rebel Motivations and Repression
Preventing and Responding to Dissent
Micromotives and macrobehavior
From mobilization to revolution
Resistance and Rebellion
Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount
Power in Numbers
Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement
Sparks and prairie fires
Dynamic models of segregation
Crisis at Tiananmen
Now out of Never
Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes
A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades
The Disposition to Secede
Theories of Revolution
Social Networks and Collective Action
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior
States and Social Revolutions
| Unique citing works | 59 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,68 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2026 (23) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 58 |