Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284116 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Allan Dafoe (0000-0003-0377-205X, Centre for the Governance of AI, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom), Remco Zwetsloot (0000-0002-2788-6257, Centre for the Governance of AI, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, corresponding author), Matthew Cebul (University of Michigan), Matthew D Cebul (0000-0003-1579-837X, University of Michigan) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 7-8 |
| Pages | 1378-1404 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002721995549 |
| OpenAlex | W3138140056 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 46 |
Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost exclusively on first-order belief change— A stands firm, B updates its beliefs about A’s resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what A believes about B’s beliefs, and so on—matter a great deal as well. When A comes to believe that B is more resolved, this may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on. In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and laying the groundwork for future research
Economics · Focus (optics · Interdependence · Motivated reasoning · Order (exchange · Political science · Positive economics · Public relations · Reputation · Sociology · Survey data collection · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |