Felix Várdy
Biographic Data
| ID | 1124443 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Felix Várdy |
| GIVEN NAMES | Felix |
| FAMILY NAME | Várdy |
| SIGNATURE | VÁRDY F |
| AFFILIATIONS | International Monetary Fund |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Ponds Dilemma
Is it better to be a big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond? To find out, we study self-selection into contests. Our simple model predicts that: 1) entry into the big pond–in terms of show-up fees, number or value of prizes–is non-monotonic in ability; 2) entry into the more meritocratic pond is likewise non-monotonic, exhibiting two interior extrema and disproportionately attracting very low ability types; and 3) changes in rewar…
Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters' Choice of News Media
Political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into 'information cocoons' and segregate along ideological lines. We show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates 'cross-over' in news consumption: voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist. This non-mo…
Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies …
On the buyability of voting bodies
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its abs…
Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters' Choice of News Media
Political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into 'information cocoons' and segregate along ideological lines. We show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates 'cross-over' in news consumption: voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist. This non-mo…
The Ponds Dilemma
Is it better to be a big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond? To find out, we study self-selection into contests. Our simple model predicts that: 1) entry into the big pond–in terms of show-up fees, number or value of prizes–is non-monotonic in ability; 2) entry into the more meritocratic pond is likewise non-monotonic, exhibiting two interior extrema and disproportionately attracting very low ability types; and 3) changes in rewar…
Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies …
On the buyability of voting bodies
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its abs…
On the buyability of voting bodies
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its abs…
Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies …
Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters' Choice of News Media
Political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into 'information cocoons' and segregate along ideological lines. We show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates 'cross-over' in news consumption: voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist. This non-mo…
The Ponds Dilemma
Is it better to be a big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond? To find out, we study self-selection into contests. Our simple model predicts that: 1) entry into the big pond–in terms of show-up fees, number or value of prizes–is non-monotonic in ability; 2) entry into the more meritocratic pond is likewise non-monotonic, exhibiting two interior extrema and disproportionately attracting very low ability types; and 3) changes in rewar…
Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)