Alexandre Debs
Biographic Data
| ID | 1127668 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alexandre Debs |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alexandre |
| FAMILY NAME | Debs |
| SIGNATURE | DEBS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3114-490X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 414 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
On Nuclear Superiority and National Security
Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuc…
In Memoriam
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis
Is mutual optimism a rationalist explanation for war? Countries are mutually optimistic if they have incompatible beliefs about the balance of power. Private information may fuel such beliefs, but it is unclear how rational countries could maintain incompatible beliefs if favorable information motivates a decision to fight, once countries incorporate their understanding of equilibrium strategies and later observe their enemy's decision to fight. …
An Economic Theory of War
When does war occur for economic reasons? In an anarchic environment, stronger states may fear that their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states and may attempt to constrain it. Weaker states, even if they are rising, may prefer to declare war. The weaker institutional constraints on stronger states are, and the smaller the spheres of influence of weaker states are, the greater are the risks of war. We illustrate our …
Response to reviews of Nuclear Politics by Coe, Kreps, and Montgomery
Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia
The election of Donald J. Trump challenged some long-held core tenets of U.S. foreign policy. For decades, U.S. administrations have valued the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons among their most
Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella
As the world awaits the next development in the nuclear standoff between U.S. president Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, it is important to take a look at the role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region, to gain some perspective on the risks that we are currently facing. Terence Roehrig provides such a historical review in his thoughtful new book. Roehrig begins with a crisp primer on nuclear deterrence theory. He then offers…
Nuclear Politics
Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation
This article critically reviews scholarship on the role of conflict and cooperation in conditioning nuclear proliferation. We start by laying out the trajectory of scholarship on the causes of proliferation, organizing it in three waves: (a) security and (b) nonsecurity drivers of proliferation, and (c) supply constraints on nuclear acquisition. We then examine the recent turn in the proliferation literature toward a strategic interaction approac…
Nuclear Politics
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? Overturning a decade of scholarship focusing on other factors, Debs and Monteiro show in Nuclear Politics that proliferation is driven by security concerns. Proliferation occurs only when a state has both the willingness and opportunity to build the bomb. A state has the willingness to nuclearize when it faces a serious security threat without the support of a reliable ally. It has the opportunity when its …
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, how…
Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships
What makes certain dictatorships more likely than others to democratize? I argue that military dictators, as specialists in violence, often remain threats to their successors. However, when democratic systems replace military dictatorships, that expertise presents less danger to new incumbents. Because democracies select leaders through elections, they reduce the importance of military expertise—and the role of associated violence—in contests for…
The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers …
Known Unknowns
Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars. Yet most large and rapid shifts result from endogenous military investments. We show that when the investment decision is perfectly transparent, peace prevails. Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power…
Economic theories of dictatorship
This article reviews recent advances in economic theories of dictatorships and their lessons for the political stability and economic performance of dictatorships. It reflects on the general usefulness of economic theories of dictatorship, with an application to foreign relations.
Inequality under Democracy
Inequality is generally thought to affect the electoral fortunes of the left, yet the theory and evidence on the question are unclear. This is the case even in Latin America, a region marked by enormous inequalities and by the stunning return of the left over the last decade. We address this shortcoming. Our game-theoretic model reveals that the probability that the left candidate is elected follows an inverted U-shaped relationship. At low level…
Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War
We propose and test a formal model of war and domestic politics, building on recent evidence on the relationship between regime type, the effect of war on the probability of losing office, and the consequences of losing office. The less the outcome of international interaction affects a leader's tenure and the less punitive are the consequences of losing office, the more a leader is willing to make concessions to strike a peaceful bargain. We dem…
Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War
We propose and test a formal model of war and domestic politics, building on recent evidence on the relationship between regime type, the effect of war on the probability of losing office, and the consequences of losing office. The less the outcome of international interaction affects a leader's tenure and the less punitive are the consequences of losing office, the more a leader is willing to make concessions to strike a peaceful bargain. We dem…
Known Unknowns
Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars. Yet most large and rapid shifts result from endogenous military investments. We show that when the investment decision is perfectly transparent, peace prevails. Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power…
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, how…
Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships
What makes certain dictatorships more likely than others to democratize? I argue that military dictators, as specialists in violence, often remain threats to their successors. However, when democratic systems replace military dictatorships, that expertise presents less danger to new incumbents. Because democracies select leaders through elections, they reduce the importance of military expertise—and the role of associated violence—in contests for…
The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers …
Inequality under Democracy
Inequality is generally thought to affect the electoral fortunes of the left, yet the theory and evidence on the question are unclear. This is the case even in Latin America, a region marked by enormous inequalities and by the stunning return of the left over the last decade. We address this shortcoming. Our game-theoretic model reveals that the probability that the left candidate is elected follows an inverted U-shaped relationship. At low level…
An Economic Theory of War
When does war occur for economic reasons? In an anarchic environment, stronger states may fear that their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states and may attempt to constrain it. Weaker states, even if they are rising, may prefer to declare war. The weaker institutional constraints on stronger states are, and the smaller the spheres of influence of weaker states are, the greater are the risks of war. We illustrate our …
Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis
Is mutual optimism a rationalist explanation for war? Countries are mutually optimistic if they have incompatible beliefs about the balance of power. Private information may fuel such beliefs, but it is unclear how rational countries could maintain incompatible beliefs if favorable information motivates a decision to fight, once countries incorporate their understanding of equilibrium strategies and later observe their enemy's decision to fight. …
Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation
This article critically reviews scholarship on the role of conflict and cooperation in conditioning nuclear proliferation. We start by laying out the trajectory of scholarship on the causes of proliferation, organizing it in three waves: (a) security and (b) nonsecurity drivers of proliferation, and (c) supply constraints on nuclear acquisition. We then examine the recent turn in the proliferation literature toward a strategic interaction approac…
On Nuclear Superiority and National Security
Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuc…
Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia
The election of Donald J. Trump challenged some long-held core tenets of U.S. foreign policy. For decades, U.S. administrations have valued the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons among their most
Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella
As the world awaits the next development in the nuclear standoff between U.S. president Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, it is important to take a look at the role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region, to gain some perspective on the risks that we are currently facing. Terence Roehrig provides such a historical review in his thoughtful new book. Roehrig begins with a crisp primer on nuclear deterrence theory. He then offers…
Economic theories of dictatorship
This article reviews recent advances in economic theories of dictatorships and their lessons for the political stability and economic performance of dictatorships. It reflects on the general usefulness of economic theories of dictatorship, with an application to foreign relations.
Inequality under Democracy
Inequality is generally thought to affect the electoral fortunes of the left, yet the theory and evidence on the question are unclear. This is the case even in Latin America, a region marked by enormous inequalities and by the stunning return of the left over the last decade. We address this shortcoming. Our game-theoretic model reveals that the probability that the left candidate is elected follows an inverted U-shaped relationship. At low level…
Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War
We propose and test a formal model of war and domestic politics, building on recent evidence on the relationship between regime type, the effect of war on the probability of losing office, and the consequences of losing office. The less the outcome of international interaction affects a leader's tenure and the less punitive are the consequences of losing office, the more a leader is willing to make concessions to strike a peaceful bargain. We dem…
The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers …
Known Unknowns
Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars. Yet most large and rapid shifts result from endogenous military investments. We show that when the investment decision is perfectly transparent, peace prevails. Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power…
Nuclear Politics
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? Overturning a decade of scholarship focusing on other factors, Debs and Monteiro show in Nuclear Politics that proliferation is driven by security concerns. Proliferation occurs only when a state has both the willingness and opportunity to build the bomb. A state has the willingness to nuclearize when it faces a serious security threat without the support of a reliable ally. It has the opportunity when its …
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, how…
Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships
What makes certain dictatorships more likely than others to democratize? I argue that military dictators, as specialists in violence, often remain threats to their successors. However, when democratic systems replace military dictatorships, that expertise presents less danger to new incumbents. Because democracies select leaders through elections, they reduce the importance of military expertise—and the role of associated violence—in contests for…
Nuclear Politics
Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation
This article critically reviews scholarship on the role of conflict and cooperation in conditioning nuclear proliferation. We start by laying out the trajectory of scholarship on the causes of proliferation, organizing it in three waves: (a) security and (b) nonsecurity drivers of proliferation, and (c) supply constraints on nuclear acquisition. We then examine the recent turn in the proliferation literature toward a strategic interaction approac…
Response to reviews of Nuclear Politics by Coe, Kreps, and Montgomery
Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia
The election of Donald J. Trump challenged some long-held core tenets of U.S. foreign policy. For decades, U.S. administrations have valued the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons among their most
Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella
As the world awaits the next development in the nuclear standoff between U.S. president Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, it is important to take a look at the role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region, to gain some perspective on the risks that we are currently facing. Terence Roehrig provides such a historical review in his thoughtful new book. Roehrig begins with a crisp primer on nuclear deterrence theory. He then offers…
An Economic Theory of War
When does war occur for economic reasons? In an anarchic environment, stronger states may fear that their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states and may attempt to constrain it. Weaker states, even if they are rising, may prefer to declare war. The weaker institutional constraints on stronger states are, and the smaller the spheres of influence of weaker states are, the greater are the risks of war. We illustrate our …
Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis
Is mutual optimism a rationalist explanation for war? Countries are mutually optimistic if they have incompatible beliefs about the balance of power. Private information may fuel such beliefs, but it is unclear how rational countries could maintain incompatible beliefs if favorable information motivates a decision to fight, once countries incorporate their understanding of equilibrium strategies and later observe their enemy's decision to fight. …
In Memoriam
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
On Nuclear Superiority and National Security
Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuc…
Political science (15 works) · Law (14 works) · Economics (13 works) · Law (11 works) · Political economy (11 works) · Politics (10 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (7 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (7 works)