Vera Flocke
Biographic Data
| ID | 1130050 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vera Flocke |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vera |
| FAMILY NAME | Flocke |
| SIGNATURE | FLOCKE V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University Bloomington |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Repugnant Conclusion of Effective Animal Altruism
Effective animal advocates want to help animals as effectively as possible. I explore a popular way of spelling out this idea, according to which, when choosing between two actions to help animals, we should pick the one that maximizes the net aggregate welfare of animals. I argue that, if this is right, then—counterintuitively—we ought to build more confined animal feeding operations. This argument is an application of Parfit's mere addition par…
No “Easy” Answers to Ontological Category Questions
Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re‐engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two‐stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first arg…
How to engineer a concept
The Metasemantics of Indefinite Extensibility
Generality relativism is the view that any domain of quantification can always be expanded. The view promises to resolve a broad range of paradoxes, but, without an explanation of how domains expand, it sounds very mysterious. Proponents of linguistic versions of generality relativism try to demystify the view by likening domain expansions to semantic change. They think that domains expand when we re-interpret certain terms so that, upon re-inter…
Scientific Ontology
What does science tell us about ontology? That's the driving question of Anjan Chakravartty's new book Scientific Ontology. Chakravartty answers the driving question by combining a naturalistic approach in metaphysics with a voluntarist approach in epistemology. Naturalized metaphysics refers to the idea that scientific ontology—conclusions about the ontological consequences of the sciences—should be informed by and continuous with the empirical …
No prominent works on this page.
Scientific Ontology
What does science tell us about ontology? That's the driving question of Anjan Chakravartty's new book Scientific Ontology. Chakravartty answers the driving question by combining a naturalistic approach in metaphysics with a voluntarist approach in epistemology. Naturalized metaphysics refers to the idea that scientific ontology—conclusions about the ontological consequences of the sciences—should be informed by and continuous with the empirical …
How to engineer a concept
The Metasemantics of Indefinite Extensibility
Generality relativism is the view that any domain of quantification can always be expanded. The view promises to resolve a broad range of paradoxes, but, without an explanation of how domains expand, it sounds very mysterious. Proponents of linguistic versions of generality relativism try to demystify the view by likening domain expansions to semantic change. They think that domains expand when we re-interpret certain terms so that, upon re-inter…
No “Easy” Answers to Ontological Category Questions
Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re‐engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two‐stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first arg…
The Repugnant Conclusion of Effective Animal Altruism
Effective animal advocates want to help animals as effectively as possible. I explore a popular way of spelling out this idea, according to which, when choosing between two actions to help animals, we should pick the one that maximizes the net aggregate welfare of animals. I argue that, if this is right, then—counterintuitively—we ought to build more confined animal feeding operations. This argument is an application of Parfit's mere addition par…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Ontology (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works)