The Metasemantics of Indefinite Extensibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293779 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vera Flocke (Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 99 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 817-834 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2020.1822894 |
| OpenAlex | W3096949452 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 30 |
Generality relativism is the view that any domain of quantification can always be expanded. The view promises to resolve a broad range of paradoxes, but, without an explanation of how domains expand, it sounds very mysterious. Proponents of linguistic versions of generality relativism try to demystify the view by likening domain expansions to semantic change. They think that domains expand when we re-interpret certain terms so that, upon re-interpretation, the quantifiers range over more things. This article makes trouble for linguistic approaches. According to the so-called charge of ineffability, generality relativism cannot be asserted in a coherent manner—given that asserting the view requires generalising over absolutely all domains of quantification. Generality relativists typically try to answer the charge with the help of modal operators; but linguistic approaches interpret these operators in semantically and syntactically idiosyncratic ways. I argue that, because of these commitments, linguistic approaches ultimately do not have a good response to the charge of ineffability
Domain (mathematical analysis) · Epistemology · Generality · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Relativism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |