James Henry Collins

Biographic Data

ID1130388
NAMEJames Henry Collins
GIVEN NAMESJames Henry
FAMILY NAMECollins
SIGNATURECOLLINS J H
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Edinburgh
ORCID0000-0003-4870-7665
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS0
WORKS AS AUTHOR5
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2013
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX0

  • Sensitivity Theorists Aren’t Unhinged

    Open AccessJames Henry Collins, Anthony BolosARTICLEErkenntnis2022

    Despite its intrinsic plausibility, the sensitivity principle has remained deeply unpopular on the grounds that it violates an even more plausible closure principle. Here we show that sensitivity does not, in general, violate closure. Sensitivity only violates closure when combined with further auxiliary premises—regarding which of an agent’s commitments constitute that agent’s beliefs—which are optional for the sensitivity theorist

  • Isaac Qatraya and the Logical Problem of Evil

    Open AccessJames Henry CollinsARTICLEReligions2022References: 19

    Sterba has recently produced a searching and significant version of the argument from evil. Here, I set out aspects of the view of God, suffering, and the afterlife articulated by Isaac Qatraya (also known as Isaac of Nineveh and Isaac the Syrian), and argue both that Isaac's view is not undermined by this version of the argument from evil, and that it is not subject to at least some of the objections Sterba raises to soul-making or saint-making …

  • What the argument from evil should, but cannot, be

    Open AccessJames Henry CollinsARTICLEReligious Studies2020

    Michael Tooley has developed a sophisticated evidential version of the argument from evil that aims to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil depend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley's defence of this inductive step depend…

  • A sensitive virtue epistemology

    Open AccessAnthony Bolos, James Henry Collins et al.ARTICLESynthese2018References: 29

  • Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

    Open AccessJames Henry CollinsARTICLEPhilosophy Compass2013References: 14

    Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism makes the case that the conjunction of evolutionary theory and naturalism cannot be rationally believed, as, if both evolutionary theory and naturalism were true, it would be highly unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable. I present Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and survey a theory of meaning espoused by Robert Brandom, known as semantic inferentialism. I…