Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079878 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Henry Collins (0000-0003-4870-7665, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 9 |
| Pages | 846-856 |
| Publication date | 2013-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12062 |
| OpenAlex | W2112447463 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism makes the case that the conjunction of evolutionary theory and naturalism cannot be rationally believed, as, if both evolutionary theory and naturalism were true, it would be highly unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable. I present Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and survey a theory of meaning espoused by Robert Brandom, known as semantic inferentialism. I argue that if one accepts semantic inferentialism, as it is developed by Brandom, then Plantinga's motivation for the evolutionary argument against naturalism is undermined
Epistemology · Naturalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|