Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
Biographic Data
| ID | 1149806 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gonzalo |
| FAMILY NAME | Rodriguez-Pereyra |
| SIGNATURE | RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Against zero-grounding
A number of grounding-theorists hold that some truths are grounded but they are not grounded in anything. These are zero-grounded truths. Some have used the idea of zero-grounding to account for the grounds of identity truths, truths of iterated grounding, negative existentials, arithmetical truths, and necessary truths. In this paper we give two arguments to the effect that zero-grounding is an unintelligible idea, and then we show that, as shou…
Critical Notice
Stephen Mumford's new book is a comprehensive study and discussion of a perennial philosophical topic: nothing, or what does not exist, or non-being. The varieties of non-being are many: negative properties, negative facts, negative particulars, non-actual beings, holes, privations, omissions, negative norms, negative epistemic states, and so on. Mumford discusses all of these, plus topics like causation by absence, perception of absence, empty r…
Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles
The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles
This chapter discusses three fundamental principles of Leibniz's philosophy: the Principle of Contradiction, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. It evaluates various formulations of these principles, their axiomatic character, and some attempts to demonstrate them. In particular, the chapter discusses in detail the derivation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Primary Truths , and argues that…
Grounding is not a Strict Order
The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also argues that truthmaking is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive.
The Language of Publication of “Analytic” Philosophy
This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections
The Explananda of the Problem of Universals
Real Metaphysics
Resemblance Nominalism
"Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses, but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either unive…
The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis
interpretation of the Problem of Universals according to which it is a problem about truthmakers. The Problem of Universals I focused on is the traditional problem also known as the ‘One over Many’, that is, ‘how can different things be of the same type?’. Thus this problem demands an answer in terms of the truthmakers of sentences (or propositions) saying that certain things are of the same type, like the following: (1) a is F and b is F Since t…
Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community
The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman's Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if 'x resembles y' is understood as…
Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot
Journal Article Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot Get access Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra Churchill College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 193, October 1998, Pages 513–522, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00119 Published: 07 January 2003
Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot
Journal Article Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot Get access Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra Churchill College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 193, October 1998, Pages 513–522, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00119 Published: 07 January 2003
Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community
The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman's Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if 'x resembles y' is understood as…
Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot
Journal Article Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot Get access Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra Churchill College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 193, October 1998, Pages 513–522, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00119 Published: 07 January 2003
Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community
The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman's Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if 'x resembles y' is understood as…
Resemblance Nominalism
"Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses, but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either unive…
The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis
interpretation of the Problem of Universals according to which it is a problem about truthmakers. The Problem of Universals I focused on is the traditional problem also known as the ‘One over Many’, that is, ‘how can different things be of the same type?’. Thus this problem demands an answer in terms of the truthmakers of sentences (or propositions) saying that certain things are of the same type, like the following: (1) a is F and b is F Since t…
Real Metaphysics
The Explananda of the Problem of Universals
The Language of Publication of “Analytic” Philosophy
This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections
Grounding is not a Strict Order
The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also argues that truthmaking is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive.
The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles
This chapter discusses three fundamental principles of Leibniz's philosophy: the Principle of Contradiction, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. It evaluates various formulations of these principles, their axiomatic character, and some attempts to demonstrate them. In particular, the chapter discusses in detail the derivation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Primary Truths , and argues that…
Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles
Critical Notice
Stephen Mumford's new book is a comprehensive study and discussion of a perennial philosophical topic: nothing, or what does not exist, or non-being. The varieties of non-being are many: negative properties, negative facts, negative particulars, non-actual beings, holes, privations, omissions, negative norms, negative epistemic states, and so on. Mumford discusses all of these, plus topics like causation by absence, perception of absence, empty r…
Against zero-grounding
A number of grounding-theorists hold that some truths are grounded but they are not grounded in anything. These are zero-grounded truths. Some have used the idea of zero-grounding to account for the grounds of identity truths, truths of iterated grounding, negative existentials, arithmetical truths, and necessary truths. In this paper we give two arguments to the effect that zero-grounding is an unintelligible idea, and then we show that, as shou…
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Identity (music) (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Nominalism (2 works)