The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis

Bibliographic Data

ID23179739
AuthorsGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo Rodriguez‐pereyra (0000-0001-5419-8532, Manchester College, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume31
Issue1
Pages39-47
Publication date2002-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Papers (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0556-8641 • E-ISSN: 1996-8523
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/05568640209485094
OpenAlexW1997067577
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited2

interpretation of the Problem of Universals according to which it is a problem about truthmakers. The Problem of Universals I focused on is the traditional problem also known as the ‘One over Many’, that is, ‘how can different things be of the same type?’. Thus this problem demands an answer in terms of the truthmakers of sentences (or propositions) saying that certain things are of the same type, like the following: (1) a is F and b is F Since the truthmakers of a conjunction like (1) are the truthmakers of its conjuncts, a solution to the Problem of Universals is concerned with the truthmakers of sentences like (2) and (3) below: (2) a is F (3) b is F But if the solution to the One over Many demands an account of the truthmakers of simple sentences like (2) and (3), then the One over Many vanishes into a more basic problem, that I call the Many over One, namely “how can the same thing be of different types?”, like sentences (2) and (4) say

Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Problem of universals · Type (biology) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History

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