Stefan Napel
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1152779 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stefan Napel |
| NOMBRES | Stefan |
| APELLIDO | Napel |
| FIRMA | NAPEL S |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Bayreuth |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7116-6441 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 34 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2004 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Relative Responsibility for Cartel Damages
Cartel members are liable jointly and severally: any infringing firm may be litigated and forced to compensate victims on behalf of all members. EU law stipulates that co-infringers must pay internal redress in proportion to »relative responsibility for the harm caused.« We suggest to quantify this by invoking basic proportioning axioms and requiring that redress payments reflect causal links between actions and damages. This calls for applicatio…
Welfare rationales for conditionality of cash transfers
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual's influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of cons…
Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication
A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations
Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis
The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environme…
The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
This article replies to the claim that preference-based power indices are impossible and that preferences should be ignored when assessing actors’ influence in different interactions (Braham and Holler [2005] ‘The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137-57). The article argues that preferences are an important determinant of potential and actual outcomes of social interaction and thereby a valuabl…
Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis
This paper proposes a unified framework that integrates the traditional index-based approach and the competing non-cooperative approach to power analysis. It rests on a quantifiable notion of ex post power as the (counter-factual) sensitivity of the expected or observed outcome to individual players. Thus, it formalizes players’ marginal impact on outcomes in both cooperative and non-cooperative games, for both strategic interaction as well as pu…
Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis
This paper proposes a unified framework that integrates the traditional index-based approach and the competing non-cooperative approach to power analysis. It rests on a quantifiable notion of ex post power as the (counter-factual) sensitivity of the expected or observed outcome to individual players. Thus, it formalizes players’ marginal impact on outcomes in both cooperative and non-cooperative games, for both strategic interaction as well as pu…
The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
This article replies to the claim that preference-based power indices are impossible and that preferences should be ignored when assessing actors’ influence in different interactions (Braham and Holler [2005] ‘The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137-57). The article argues that preferences are an important determinant of potential and actual outcomes of social interaction and thereby a valuabl…
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual's influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of cons…
Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis
The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environme…
Welfare rationales for conditionality of cash transfers
A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations
Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication
Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis
This paper proposes a unified framework that integrates the traditional index-based approach and the competing non-cooperative approach to power analysis. It rests on a quantifiable notion of ex post power as the (counter-factual) sensitivity of the expected or observed outcome to individual players. Thus, it formalizes players’ marginal impact on outcomes in both cooperative and non-cooperative games, for both strategic interaction as well as pu…
The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
This article replies to the claim that preference-based power indices are impossible and that preferences should be ignored when assessing actors’ influence in different interactions (Braham and Holler [2005] ‘The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137-57). The article argues that preferences are an important determinant of potential and actual outcomes of social interaction and thereby a valuabl…
Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis
The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environme…
The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations
Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication
A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual's influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of cons…
Welfare rationales for conditionality of cash transfers
Relative Responsibility for Cartel Damages
Cartel members are liable jointly and severally: any infringing firm may be litigated and forced to compensate victims on behalf of all members. EU law stipulates that co-infringers must pay internal redress in proportion to »relative responsibility for the harm caused.« We suggest to quantify this by invoking basic proportioning axioms and requiring that redress payments reflect causal links between actions and damages. This calls for applicatio…
Economics (8 obras) · Mathematical economics (6 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras) · Politics (4 obras)