Jonas Scherner
Biographic Data
| ID | 1154384 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonas Scherner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonas |
| FAMILY NAME | Scherner |
| SIGNATURE | SCHERNER J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Mannheim |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3990-8548 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 31 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Germany, Blockade and Strategic Raw Materials in the Era of the Two World Wars
The concrete lessons that the Nazi regime drew from the Allied sea blockade of the First World War have only been studied in fragments. Our knowledge of the effects of blockade and the effectiveness of German countermeasures during the Great War is vague, contradictory and, above all, incomplete, mainly for a lack of data. Based on hitherto unused secret surveys and statistics commissioned by the Nazi government to examine Great War lessons, this…
Introduction
How did blockades shape the course, outcome and aftermath of the world wars? In both wars, belligerents sought to blockade their enemies, cutting them off from vital resources such as food, oil, information and capital to hasten their defeat. They thus impacted societies the world over, testing their resilience and vulnerability. They produced new forms of violence and humanitarian care, prompted innovation and learning, and had integrative and d…
Infant company protection in the German semi-synthetic fibre industry
In the 1920 and early 1930s, the German semi-synthetic fibre industry was dominated by a duopoly of two big players. The incumbent firms were not willing to expand their staple fibre capacities to the extent demanded by the new Nazi government, which prepared for autarky and war. Hence the government encouraged other private companies, especially spinning mills, to found eight regional staple fibre plants and protected them against the incumbents…
Incompetence or Ingenuity? Why Did Nazi Germany Not Seek Closer Wartime Economic Cooperation with Italy
This article sheds light on why there was, and why Nazi Germany pursued, only comparatively little economic cooperation between the two most important axis partners, Italy and Germany, during the Second World War. In particular, the article looks more closely at the two countries’ cooperation in terms of raw materials, crucial to the war economy: why did Germany not deliver more raw materials to Italy and why did an underutilized Italian industry…
Preparing for the Next Blockade
This article refutes a fundamental assumption behind the Western powers' 'long-war strategy' in 1939, and casts doubt on the conventional wisdom regarding the alleged unpreparedness of Nazi Germany for a longer war. It does so by re-examining Germany's war-preparedness through the lens of those raw materials that were of vital importance for the production of all armaments: non-ferrous metals. Contemporaries believed that these metals were the Ac…
Stephen G. Gross. Export Empire
Some months ago, German newspapers reported with a degree of pride that Germany would once again be Exportweltmeister (export world champion) in 2016 as measured by the current account surplus and effected primarily through massive merchandise exports. As today, merchandise exports played a pivotal role in the German business model between the early Wilhelminian period and the end of World War II. This period, especially the turbulent decades aft…
Die Grenzen der Informationsbeschaffung, -transfer und -verarbeitung in der deutschen Wehr- und Kriegswirtschaftsverwaltung im Dritten Reich
During World War II an increasing share of the industrial output of Germany and the Nazi-ruled European economies was converted for use in the German war effort. In order to steer this conversion, information gathering and processing were crucial. This paper examines the institutions and instruments of the German system of information gathering and processing and tries to identify its successes and failures. It will be shown that the origins of t…
Supplier networks in the German aircraft industry during World War II and their long-term effects on West Germany's automobile industry during the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’
Reconstructing the complex supplier network of the famous JU 88 air armament programme, this article shows that outsourcing activities increased considerably in wartime Germany. The resulting inter-firm division of labour did not lead only to a quite effective protection of the German aircraft production against Allied air raids but also contributed to enormous labour productivity growth in most stages of the production process. Even though aircr…
Armament in depth' or 'armament in breadth'? German investment pattern and rearmament during the Nazi period1
Today, most scholars agree that Nazi Germany did not follow a premeditated Blitzkrieg strategy in the late 1930s and at the beginning of the Second World War. However, the question of the extent to which Germany's economy had been prepared for a longer war is still debated because statistical information on Germany's investment pattern is fragmentary and data on the structure of prewar German military expenditure are not available. Relying on new…
Der deutsche Importboom während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Neue Ergebnisse zur Struktur der Ausbeutung des besetzten Europas auf der Grundlage einer Neuschätzung der deutschen Handelsbilanz
Bis heute sind die vom Statistischen Reichsamt veröffentlichten Daten zur deutschen Handelsbilanz Grundlage für Aussagen über den Außenhandel Deutschlands im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Danach war die Handelsbilanz des Reiches in den betreffenden Jahren fast ausgeglichen und das Außenhandelsdefizit mit den besetzten Ländern erstaunlich gering. Daher kann nur ein Bruchteil der Mittel, die Deutschland aus dem besetzten Europa in Form von Besatzungskosten un…
France's Occupation Costs and the War in the East
This article analyses how Nazi Germany exploited France, which – from an economic point of view – was the most important occupied country during the Second World War. We can show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, there was no clear-cut caesura in Germany’s policy of exploiting occupied France – not in the extent of the exploitation in real terms or in the kind of policy toward occupation funds. Although the war in the East and prepara…
Fixed-price contracts, learning, and outsourcing
In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm-level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especial…
The beginnings of Nazi autarky policy
In 1934, the Nazi regime decided to expand German staple fibre capacities significantly. The planned expansion expressed by the 'National Pulp Programme' was not only motivated by the balance of payments crisis at this time, but also by long-term autarky considerations. However, private companies and the Nazi regime disagreed on the size of the cellulose fibre markets and on how risks were to be shared. Therefore the Nazi regime considered the fo…
Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rüstungswunder
Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German armament production after 1941 by implementing several organizational reforms. We question the received view by showing that there was nothing like a clear-cut discontinuity in both real production and organization of the German armament industry after Speer was appointed armament minister. With respect to organizational reforms, Speer obviously failed to enforce t…
The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy
Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of con…
Ohne Rücksicht auf Kosten“
Eliten und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Spanien und das Königreich Polen im 19. Jahrhundert
Article Eliten und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Spanien und das Königreich Polen im 19. Jahrhundert was published on December 1, 2002 in the journal Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook (volume 43, issue 2)
The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy
Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of con…
Supplier networks in the German aircraft industry during World War II and their long-term effects on West Germany's automobile industry during the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’
Reconstructing the complex supplier network of the famous JU 88 air armament programme, this article shows that outsourcing activities increased considerably in wartime Germany. The resulting inter-firm division of labour did not lead only to a quite effective protection of the German aircraft production against Allied air raids but also contributed to enormous labour productivity growth in most stages of the production process. Even though aircr…
Fixed-price contracts, learning, and outsourcing
In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm-level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especial…
Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rüstungswunder
Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German armament production after 1941 by implementing several organizational reforms. We question the received view by showing that there was nothing like a clear-cut discontinuity in both real production and organization of the German armament industry after Speer was appointed armament minister. With respect to organizational reforms, Speer obviously failed to enforce t…
The beginnings of Nazi autarky policy
In 1934, the Nazi regime decided to expand German staple fibre capacities significantly. The planned expansion expressed by the 'National Pulp Programme' was not only motivated by the balance of payments crisis at this time, but also by long-term autarky considerations. However, private companies and the Nazi regime disagreed on the size of the cellulose fibre markets and on how risks were to be shared. Therefore the Nazi regime considered the fo…
Preparing for the Next Blockade
This article refutes a fundamental assumption behind the Western powers' 'long-war strategy' in 1939, and casts doubt on the conventional wisdom regarding the alleged unpreparedness of Nazi Germany for a longer war. It does so by re-examining Germany's war-preparedness through the lens of those raw materials that were of vital importance for the production of all armaments: non-ferrous metals. Contemporaries believed that these metals were the Ac…
France's Occupation Costs and the War in the East
This article analyses how Nazi Germany exploited France, which – from an economic point of view – was the most important occupied country during the Second World War. We can show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, there was no clear-cut caesura in Germany’s policy of exploiting occupied France – not in the extent of the exploitation in real terms or in the kind of policy toward occupation funds. Although the war in the East and prepara…
Germany, Blockade and Strategic Raw Materials in the Era of the Two World Wars
The concrete lessons that the Nazi regime drew from the Allied sea blockade of the First World War have only been studied in fragments. Our knowledge of the effects of blockade and the effectiveness of German countermeasures during the Great War is vague, contradictory and, above all, incomplete, mainly for a lack of data. Based on hitherto unused secret surveys and statistics commissioned by the Nazi government to examine Great War lessons, this…
Armament in depth' or 'armament in breadth'? German investment pattern and rearmament during the Nazi period1
Today, most scholars agree that Nazi Germany did not follow a premeditated Blitzkrieg strategy in the late 1930s and at the beginning of the Second World War. However, the question of the extent to which Germany's economy had been prepared for a longer war is still debated because statistical information on Germany's investment pattern is fragmentary and data on the structure of prewar German military expenditure are not available. Relying on new…
Eliten und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Spanien und das Königreich Polen im 19. Jahrhundert
Article Eliten und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Spanien und das Königreich Polen im 19. Jahrhundert was published on December 1, 2002 in the journal Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook (volume 43, issue 2)
Ohne Rücksicht auf Kosten“
Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rüstungswunder
Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German armament production after 1941 by implementing several organizational reforms. We question the received view by showing that there was nothing like a clear-cut discontinuity in both real production and organization of the German armament industry after Speer was appointed armament minister. With respect to organizational reforms, Speer obviously failed to enforce t…
The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy
Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of con…
The beginnings of Nazi autarky policy
In 1934, the Nazi regime decided to expand German staple fibre capacities significantly. The planned expansion expressed by the 'National Pulp Programme' was not only motivated by the balance of payments crisis at this time, but also by long-term autarky considerations. However, private companies and the Nazi regime disagreed on the size of the cellulose fibre markets and on how risks were to be shared. Therefore the Nazi regime considered the fo…
Fixed-price contracts, learning, and outsourcing
In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm-level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especial…
Der deutsche Importboom während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Neue Ergebnisse zur Struktur der Ausbeutung des besetzten Europas auf der Grundlage einer Neuschätzung der deutschen Handelsbilanz
Bis heute sind die vom Statistischen Reichsamt veröffentlichten Daten zur deutschen Handelsbilanz Grundlage für Aussagen über den Außenhandel Deutschlands im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Danach war die Handelsbilanz des Reiches in den betreffenden Jahren fast ausgeglichen und das Außenhandelsdefizit mit den besetzten Ländern erstaunlich gering. Daher kann nur ein Bruchteil der Mittel, die Deutschland aus dem besetzten Europa in Form von Besatzungskosten un…
France's Occupation Costs and the War in the East
This article analyses how Nazi Germany exploited France, which – from an economic point of view – was the most important occupied country during the Second World War. We can show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, there was no clear-cut caesura in Germany’s policy of exploiting occupied France – not in the extent of the exploitation in real terms or in the kind of policy toward occupation funds. Although the war in the East and prepara…
Armament in depth' or 'armament in breadth'? German investment pattern and rearmament during the Nazi period1
Today, most scholars agree that Nazi Germany did not follow a premeditated Blitzkrieg strategy in the late 1930s and at the beginning of the Second World War. However, the question of the extent to which Germany's economy had been prepared for a longer war is still debated because statistical information on Germany's investment pattern is fragmentary and data on the structure of prewar German military expenditure are not available. Relying on new…
Supplier networks in the German aircraft industry during World War II and their long-term effects on West Germany's automobile industry during the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’
Reconstructing the complex supplier network of the famous JU 88 air armament programme, this article shows that outsourcing activities increased considerably in wartime Germany. The resulting inter-firm division of labour did not lead only to a quite effective protection of the German aircraft production against Allied air raids but also contributed to enormous labour productivity growth in most stages of the production process. Even though aircr…
Die Grenzen der Informationsbeschaffung, -transfer und -verarbeitung in der deutschen Wehr- und Kriegswirtschaftsverwaltung im Dritten Reich
During World War II an increasing share of the industrial output of Germany and the Nazi-ruled European economies was converted for use in the German war effort. In order to steer this conversion, information gathering and processing were crucial. This paper examines the institutions and instruments of the German system of information gathering and processing and tries to identify its successes and failures. It will be shown that the origins of t…
Stephen G. Gross. Export Empire
Some months ago, German newspapers reported with a degree of pride that Germany would once again be Exportweltmeister (export world champion) in 2016 as measured by the current account surplus and effected primarily through massive merchandise exports. As today, merchandise exports played a pivotal role in the German business model between the early Wilhelminian period and the end of World War II. This period, especially the turbulent decades aft…
Incompetence or Ingenuity? Why Did Nazi Germany Not Seek Closer Wartime Economic Cooperation with Italy
This article sheds light on why there was, and why Nazi Germany pursued, only comparatively little economic cooperation between the two most important axis partners, Italy and Germany, during the Second World War. In particular, the article looks more closely at the two countries’ cooperation in terms of raw materials, crucial to the war economy: why did Germany not deliver more raw materials to Italy and why did an underutilized Italian industry…
Preparing for the Next Blockade
This article refutes a fundamental assumption behind the Western powers' 'long-war strategy' in 1939, and casts doubt on the conventional wisdom regarding the alleged unpreparedness of Nazi Germany for a longer war. It does so by re-examining Germany's war-preparedness through the lens of those raw materials that were of vital importance for the production of all armaments: non-ferrous metals. Contemporaries believed that these metals were the Ac…
Infant company protection in the German semi-synthetic fibre industry
In the 1920 and early 1930s, the German semi-synthetic fibre industry was dominated by a duopoly of two big players. The incumbent firms were not willing to expand their staple fibre capacities to the extent demanded by the new Nazi government, which prepared for autarky and war. Hence the government encouraged other private companies, especially spinning mills, to found eight regional staple fibre plants and protected them against the incumbents…
Germany, Blockade and Strategic Raw Materials in the Era of the Two World Wars
The concrete lessons that the Nazi regime drew from the Allied sea blockade of the First World War have only been studied in fragments. Our knowledge of the effects of blockade and the effectiveness of German countermeasures during the Great War is vague, contradictory and, above all, incomplete, mainly for a lack of data. Based on hitherto unused secret surveys and statistics commissioned by the Nazi government to examine Great War lessons, this…
Introduction
How did blockades shape the course, outcome and aftermath of the world wars? In both wars, belligerents sought to blockade their enemies, cutting them off from vital resources such as food, oil, information and capital to hasten their defeat. They thus impacted societies the world over, testing their resilience and vulnerability. They produced new forms of violence and humanitarian care, prompted innovation and learning, and had integrative and d…
Political science (14 works) · Economics (13 works) · European history and politics (11 works) · German (11 works) · Law (11 works) · Economic history (9 works) · History (9 works) · Economy (8 works) · Nazism (8 works) · World War II (8 works)