Antoine Loeper
Biographic Data
| ID | 1173009 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antoine Loeper |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antoine |
| FAMILY NAME | Loeper |
| SIGNATURE | LOEPER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9210-5405 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 35 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Dynamic Pivotal Politics
We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today's policy becomes tomorrow's status quo. Unlike in existing models of pivotal politics, policy makers' voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks. Relative to sincere voting, the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect, which incr…
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
We analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo. The endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest: Players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo. This leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia. Under certain conditions, the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock: Players never reach an agreement. Gridlock can occu…
Influential Opinion Leaders
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special \ninterests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium \noutcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of \nexpert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert \nhas a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results fr…
Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule
I consider a heterogeneous federal system in which policy coordination is desirable but underprovided in the absence of a federal intervention. To improve policy coordination, the federal layer can intervene by imposing bounds on local policies. These federal bounds define a restricted policy space within which local jurisdictions have residual discretion. I analyze a voting game in which the federal bounds are determined directly by the citizens…
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
We analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo. The endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest: Players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo. This leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia. Under certain conditions, the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock: Players never reach an agreement. Gridlock can occu…
Dynamic Pivotal Politics
We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today's policy becomes tomorrow's status quo. Unlike in existing models of pivotal politics, policy makers' voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks. Relative to sincere voting, the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect, which incr…
Influential Opinion Leaders
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special \ninterests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium \noutcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of \nexpert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert \nhas a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results fr…
Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule
I consider a heterogeneous federal system in which policy coordination is desirable but underprovided in the absence of a federal intervention. To improve policy coordination, the federal layer can intervene by imposing bounds on local policies. These federal bounds define a restricted policy space within which local jurisdictions have residual discretion. I analyze a voting game in which the federal bounds are determined directly by the citizens…
Influential Opinion Leaders
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special \ninterests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium \noutcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of \nexpert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert \nhas a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results fr…
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
We analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo. The endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest: Players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo. This leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia. Under certain conditions, the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock: Players never reach an agreement. Gridlock can occu…
Dynamic Pivotal Politics
We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today's policy becomes tomorrow's status quo. Unlike in existing models of pivotal politics, policy makers' voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks. Relative to sincere voting, the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect, which incr…
Political science (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (3 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Market economy (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)