Influential Opinion Leaders
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9715412 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Antoine Loeper (0000-0001-9210-5405, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Jakub Steiner (0000-0001-6975-9072, The University of Edinburgh and CERGE-EI), Colin Stewart (0000-0002-0288-0844, University of Toronto) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 124 |
| Issue | 581 |
| Pages | 1147-1167 |
| Publication date | 2014-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12100 |
| OpenAlex | W3126035289 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 47 |
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special \ninterests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium \noutcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of \nexpert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert \nhas a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is \nmultiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements \nand to the diffusion of products with network externalities
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
When Can Citizen Communication Hinder Successful Revolution
Social influence
Shifting social norms through endorsements
Does temporary employment undermine the quality of permanent jobs? Evidence from the manufacturing industry
Multiplicity and Uniqueness in Regime Change Games
Investment in the Shadow of Conflict
Rebel Motivations and Repression
On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
Personal Influence
The East German revolution of 1989
The Rebellious Century
Power in Numbers
Collective Action Cascades
Voting as an act of contribution
Sparks and prairie fires
A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities
HMG and the War against Dissent, 1914-18
Information Cascades and Revolutionary Regime Transitions
Now out of Never
Social Theory and Social Structure
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades
The Influentials
On the rhetorical strategies of leaders
Theories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989
States and Social Revolutions
Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960
Dissident Groups, Personal Networks, and Spontaneous Cooperation
What Moves Public Opinion
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
The Social Calculus of Voting
The Patterning of Repression
Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation
Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism
Recruitment to High-Risk Activism
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,9 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |