Stephen Engstrom
Biographic Data
| ID | 1178351 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stephen Engstrom |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stephen |
| FAMILY NAME | Engstrom |
| SIGNATURE | ENGSTROM S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pittsburgh |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 66 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Determination of the Concept of the Highest Good
Reflection and Reason in Hume and Kant
In her provocative paper 'Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant', Annette Baier compares the different ways in which Humean and Kantian moralities 'pressure people into conformity to the morality in question'. i Her comparison starts from the idea that these two systems can be seen, respectively, as shame and guilt moralities, with shaming and punishment as the two mechanisms of enforcement. For Humean morality, she claims, mockery a…
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
Herman on Moral Literacy
In her recent book, Barbara Herman explores a range of topics commonly associated with virtue ethics; her focus, however, is not so much on virtue as on normal moral competence and the basic moral capacity underpinning it. To explicate this competence, Herman introduces the idea of moral literacy, arguing that it reveals Kantian ethical thought to be better able than Humean views to account for our readiness to hold persons responsible even for c…
The Form of Practical Knowledge
Preface * Note on Citations * Introduction Part I. Willing as Practical Knowing * The Will and Practical Judgment * Fundamental Practical Judgments: The Wish for Happiness Part II. From Presuppositions of Judgment to the Idea of a Categorical Imperative * The Formal Presuppositions of Practical Judgment * Constraints on Willing Part III. Interpretation * The Categorical Imperative * Applications * Conclusion * Epilogue * Index
Understanding and Sensibility
Kant holds that the human cognitive power is divided into two “stems”, understanding and sensibility. This doctrine has seemed objectionably dualistic to many critics, who see these stems as distinct parts, each able on its own to produce representations, which must somehow interact, determining or constraining one another, in order to secure the fit, requisite for cognition, between concept and intuition. This reading cannot be squared, however,…
Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics
Part I. Deliberation and Moral Development: 1. Deliberation and moral development in Aristotle's ethics John McDowell 2. Making room for character Barbara Herman Part II. Eudaimonism: 3. Kant's criticisms of Eudaimonism T. H. Irwin 4. Happiness and the highest good in Aristotle and Kant Stephen Engstrom Part III. Self-Love and Self-Worth: 5. Self-love, self-benevolence, and self-conceit Allen W. Wood 6. Self-love and authoritative virtue: Prolego…
The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism
The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism STEPHEN ENGSTROM IT HAS OFTEN BEEN ASSUMEDthat Kant's aim in the Transcendental Deduction includes a refutation of skepticism.' But this assumption has led interpreters to conclude not only that the Deduction is at least in large part a failure, but also that Kant is confused about how his objectives should be achieved and even about what they are. Such a conclusion may well raise doubts about the initi…
The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory
Kant claims that the concept of the highest good, the idea of a state or condition in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, follows as a consequence from the moral law. But it is not clear how it follows, nor indeed whether it follows at all. How, it has often been asked, can a law that requires us to act morally regardless of whether our personal happiness follows as a consequence be the source of an obligation to promote a state in which m…
Conditioned Autonomy
Understanding and Sensibility
Kant holds that the human cognitive power is divided into two “stems”, understanding and sensibility. This doctrine has seemed objectionably dualistic to many critics, who see these stems as distinct parts, each able on its own to produce representations, which must somehow interact, determining or constraining one another, in order to secure the fit, requisite for cognition, between concept and intuition. This reading cannot be squared, however,…
The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory
Kant claims that the concept of the highest good, the idea of a state or condition in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, follows as a consequence from the moral law. But it is not clear how it follows, nor indeed whether it follows at all. How, it has often been asked, can a law that requires us to act morally regardless of whether our personal happiness follows as a consequence be the source of an obligation to promote a state in which m…
The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism
The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism STEPHEN ENGSTROM IT HAS OFTEN BEEN ASSUMEDthat Kant's aim in the Transcendental Deduction includes a refutation of skepticism.' But this assumption has led interpreters to conclude not only that the Deduction is at least in large part a failure, but also that Kant is confused about how his objectives should be achieved and even about what they are. Such a conclusion may well raise doubts about the initi…
Conditioned Autonomy
Conditioned Autonomy
The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory
Kant claims that the concept of the highest good, the idea of a state or condition in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, follows as a consequence from the moral law. But it is not clear how it follows, nor indeed whether it follows at all. How, it has often been asked, can a law that requires us to act morally regardless of whether our personal happiness follows as a consequence be the source of an obligation to promote a state in which m…
The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism
The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism STEPHEN ENGSTROM IT HAS OFTEN BEEN ASSUMEDthat Kant's aim in the Transcendental Deduction includes a refutation of skepticism.' But this assumption has led interpreters to conclude not only that the Deduction is at least in large part a failure, but also that Kant is confused about how his objectives should be achieved and even about what they are. Such a conclusion may well raise doubts about the initi…
Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics
Part I. Deliberation and Moral Development: 1. Deliberation and moral development in Aristotle's ethics John McDowell 2. Making room for character Barbara Herman Part II. Eudaimonism: 3. Kant's criticisms of Eudaimonism T. H. Irwin 4. Happiness and the highest good in Aristotle and Kant Stephen Engstrom Part III. Self-Love and Self-Worth: 5. Self-love, self-benevolence, and self-conceit Allen W. Wood 6. Self-love and authoritative virtue: Prolego…
Understanding and Sensibility
Kant holds that the human cognitive power is divided into two “stems”, understanding and sensibility. This doctrine has seemed objectionably dualistic to many critics, who see these stems as distinct parts, each able on its own to produce representations, which must somehow interact, determining or constraining one another, in order to secure the fit, requisite for cognition, between concept and intuition. This reading cannot be squared, however,…
The Form of Practical Knowledge
Preface * Note on Citations * Introduction Part I. Willing as Practical Knowing * The Will and Practical Judgment * Fundamental Practical Judgments: The Wish for Happiness Part II. From Presuppositions of Judgment to the Idea of a Categorical Imperative * The Formal Presuppositions of Practical Judgment * Constraints on Willing Part III. Interpretation * The Categorical Imperative * Applications * Conclusion * Epilogue * Index
Herman on Moral Literacy
In her recent book, Barbara Herman explores a range of topics commonly associated with virtue ethics; her focus, however, is not so much on virtue as on normal moral competence and the basic moral capacity underpinning it. To explicate this competence, Herman introduces the idea of moral literacy, arguing that it reveals Kantian ethical thought to be better able than Humean views to account for our readiness to hold persons responsible even for c…
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
Reflection and Reason in Hume and Kant
In her provocative paper 'Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant', Annette Baier compares the different ways in which Humean and Kantian moralities 'pressure people into conformity to the morality in question'. i Her comparison starts from the idea that these two systems can be seen, respectively, as shame and guilt moralities, with shaming and punishment as the two mechanisms of enforcement. For Humean morality, she claims, mockery a…
The Determination of the Concept of the Highest Good
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works)