Reflection and Reason in Hume and Kant
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19553233 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephen Engstrom (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 15-32 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Hegel Bulletin (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2051-5367 • E-ISSN: 2051-5375 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/hgl.2015.2 |
| OpenAlex | W2333581429 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 5 |
In her provocative paper 'Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant', Annette Baier compares the different ways in which Humean and Kantian moralities 'pressure people into conformity to the morality in question'. i Her comparison starts from the idea that these two systems can be seen, respectively, as shame and guilt moralities, with shaming and punishment as the two mechanisms of enforcement. For Humean morality, she claims, mockery and laughter serve that function, whereas Kantian morality maintains itself through commands and punishments. Now a system that relies on commands and punishments is inherently coercive, and Baier's concern, if I understand her, is that such a system, at least in its Kantian version, is prone to moralism and to punishments that are cruel. Cruelty, she points out, is, according to Hume, the worst of the vices. So what is a Humean moral philosopher to do, when confronted with the Kantian position, but to mock it on account of these features? And that is what, at the conclusion of her paper, she represents herself as doing: mocking 'the Kantian moralist', asking 'Why should you be so cruel to yourself ?'
Epistemology · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |