Oded Na’aman
Biographic Data
| ID | 1178548 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oded Na’aman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oded |
| FAMILY NAME | Na’aman |
| SIGNATURE | NA’AMAN O |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9653-6798 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The alchemists
D’Arms and Jacobson’s Rational Sentimentalism promises an alchemy: a view that grounds certain values and reasons in facts about human sentiments but also treats the very same facts about values and reasons as fundamental. I examine how they attempt to deliver on the promise, doubt that they succeed, consider their motivations, and offer an alternative interpretation of what they might be doing
On the Temporality of Emotions
The subtleties of fit
Emotions and Process Rationality
Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015 Hedden, B. 2015. Time-Slice Rationality, Mind 124/494: 449–91. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu181[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2016; Moss 2015 Moss, S. 2015. Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John…
What Makes Something Surprising
Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive‐neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this a…
Can We Intend the Past
First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offe…
What Makes Something Surprising
Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive‐neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this a…
Can We Intend the Past
First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offe…
Emotions and Process Rationality
Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015 Hedden, B. 2015. Time-Slice Rationality, Mind 124/494: 449–91. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu181[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2016; Moss 2015 Moss, S. 2015. Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John…
What Makes Something Surprising
Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive‐neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this a…
The subtleties of fit
On the Temporality of Emotions
The alchemists
D’Arms and Jacobson’s Rational Sentimentalism promises an alchemy: a view that grounds certain values and reasons in facts about human sentiments but also treats the very same facts about values and reasons as fundamental. I examine how they attempt to deliver on the promise, doubt that they succeed, consider their motivations, and offer an alternative interpretation of what they might be doing
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Interpretation (philosophy) (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)