Can We Intend the Past
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19524976 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Oded Na’aman (0000-0001-9653-6798, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 304-311 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061 |
| Publisher | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.268 |
| OpenAlex | W2779505311 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality of choice
Epistemology · Digital Humanities and Scholarship · Philosophy · Philosophy, History, and Historiography · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |