Elmar Unnsteinsson
Biographic Data
| ID | 1179789 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elmar Unnsteinsson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elmar |
| FAMILY NAME | Unnsteinsson |
| SIGNATURE | UNNSTEINSSON E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College Dublin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5333-1784 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Genre and Conversation
Conversations can belong to different types, or genres . We consider four dimensions of variation as case studies: Some conversations are about sharing information, others about making decisions; some are about making firm commitments, others about brainstorming options; some are about sticking to the facts, others involve make‐believe; some are highly cooperative, others adversarial. These are orthogonal dimensions of variation which explain why…
Inference and identity
I argue that beliefs about the identity or distinctness of objects are necessary to explain some normal inferential transitions between thoughts in humans. Worries about vicious regress are not powerful enough to dismantle such an argument. As an upshot, the idea that thinkers “trade on” identity without any corresponding belief remains somewhat mysterious
Talking about
I respond to comments from Mark Bowker, Jessica Keiser, and Eliot Michaelson on my book, Talking About. The response clarifies my stance on the nature of reference, conflicting intentions, and the sense in which language may have proper functions
The social epistemology of introspection
I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by s…
Authentic Speech and Insincerity
Many theorists assume that a request is sincere if the speaker wants the addressee to perform the act requested. I argue that this assumption predicts an implausible mismatch between sincere assertions and sincere directives and needs to be revised. I present an alternative view, according to which directive utterances can only be sincere if they are self-directed. Other-directed directives, however, can be genuine or fake, depending on whether t…
How to Express Implicit Attitudes
I argue that what speakers mean or express can be determined by their implicit or unconscious states, rather than explicit or conscious states. Further, on this basis, I show that the sincerity conditions for utterances can also be fixed by implicit states. This is a surprising result, which goes against common assumptions about speech acts and sincerity. Roughly, I argue that the result is implied by two plausible and independent theories of the…
Frege's Puzzle is About Identity After All
Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory…
Wittgenstein's influence on Austin's philosophy of language
Many philosophers have assumed, without argument, that Wittgenstein influenced Austin. More often, however, this is vehemently denied, especially by those who knew Austin personally. We compile and assess the currently available evidence for Wittgenstein's influence on Austin's philosophy of language. Surprisingly, this has not been done before in any detail. On the basis of both textual and circumstantial evidence we show that Austin's work demo…
Compositionality and sandbag semantics
Wittgenstein's influence on Austin's philosophy of language
Many philosophers have assumed, without argument, that Wittgenstein influenced Austin. More often, however, this is vehemently denied, especially by those who knew Austin personally. We compile and assess the currently available evidence for Wittgenstein's influence on Austin's philosophy of language. Surprisingly, this has not been done before in any detail. On the basis of both textual and circumstantial evidence we show that Austin's work demo…
Compositionality and sandbag semantics
Compositionality and sandbag semantics
Wittgenstein's influence on Austin's philosophy of language
Many philosophers have assumed, without argument, that Wittgenstein influenced Austin. More often, however, this is vehemently denied, especially by those who knew Austin personally. We compile and assess the currently available evidence for Wittgenstein's influence on Austin's philosophy of language. Surprisingly, this has not been done before in any detail. On the basis of both textual and circumstantial evidence we show that Austin's work demo…
Frege's Puzzle is About Identity After All
Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory…
The social epistemology of introspection
I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by s…
Authentic Speech and Insincerity
Many theorists assume that a request is sincere if the speaker wants the addressee to perform the act requested. I argue that this assumption predicts an implausible mismatch between sincere assertions and sincere directives and needs to be revised. I present an alternative view, according to which directive utterances can only be sincere if they are self-directed. Other-directed directives, however, can be genuine or fake, depending on whether t…
How to Express Implicit Attitudes
I argue that what speakers mean or express can be determined by their implicit or unconscious states, rather than explicit or conscious states. Further, on this basis, I show that the sincerity conditions for utterances can also be fixed by implicit states. This is a surprising result, which goes against common assumptions about speech acts and sincerity. Roughly, I argue that the result is implied by two plausible and independent theories of the…
Inference and identity
I argue that beliefs about the identity or distinctness of objects are necessary to explain some normal inferential transitions between thoughts in humans. Worries about vicious regress are not powerful enough to dismantle such an argument. As an upshot, the idea that thinkers “trade on” identity without any corresponding belief remains somewhat mysterious
Talking about
I respond to comments from Mark Bowker, Jessica Keiser, and Eliot Michaelson on my book, Talking About. The response clarifies my stance on the nature of reference, conflicting intentions, and the sense in which language may have proper functions
Genre and Conversation
Conversations can belong to different types, or genres . We consider four dimensions of variation as case studies: Some conversations are about sharing information, others about making decisions; some are about making firm commitments, others about brainstorming options; some are about sticking to the facts, others involve make‐believe; some are highly cooperative, others adversarial. These are orthogonal dimensions of variation which explain why…
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (3 works)