The social epistemology of introspection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501813 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elmar Unnsteinsson (0000-0001-5333-1784, School of Philosophy University College Dublin Dublin Ireland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 925-942 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12438 |
| OpenAlex | W4289521701 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 47 |
I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other forms of self‐directed representation. If so, it becomes unclear in what sense social epistemology is social
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Introspection · Linguistics · Mental representation · Mental state · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Theory of mind · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Linguistic communication and speech acts
Inner Speech
Subjective Consciousness
The Opacity of MindAn Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge
The Enigma of Reason
Thoughts and Utterances
Explaining the Brain
The New Mechanical Philosophy
Meaning and Relevance
Speaking
The evolution and psychology of self-deception
The Faculty of Language
Paul Grice and the philosophy of language
How To Do Things With Words
Aspects of Reason
Consciousness and Experience
The Things We Mean
A Mark of the Mental
Semantics without semantic content
Natural Selection and Social Theory
Speaking Our Minds
Speaking My Mind
Authority and Estrangement
Epistemic Vigilance
A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function
The Functional Sense of Mechanism
Evidential Preemption
Putting History Back into Mechanisms
Local pragmatics in a Gricean framework
Inner speech
Speech Acts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |