Stephen Puryear
Biographic Data
| ID | 1183034 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stephen Puryear |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stephen |
| FAMILY NAME | Puryear |
| SIGNATURE | PURYEAR S |
| AFFILIATIONS | North Carolina State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4517-005X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Why Leibniz should have agreed with Berkeley about abstract ideas
Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract t…
Consent by residence
The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state i…
The Logic of Leibniz's Borrowed Reality Argument
Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this 'borrowed reality argument' has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness o…
On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming
Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status
Idealism and Scepticism
Anthony B rueckner argues that B erkeleyan idealism lacks anti‐sceptical force because of the way B erkeley draws the appearance/reality distinction. But B rueckner's case rests on a misunderstanding of B erkeley's view. Properly understood, B erkeleyan idealism does indeed have anti‐sceptical force
Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language
Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed t…
Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color
Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent inco…
Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status
Consent by residence
The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state i…
Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language
Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed t…
Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color
Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent inco…
Idealism and Scepticism
Anthony B rueckner argues that B erkeleyan idealism lacks anti‐sceptical force because of the way B erkeley draws the appearance/reality distinction. But B rueckner's case rests on a misunderstanding of B erkeley's view. Properly understood, B erkeleyan idealism does indeed have anti‐sceptical force
Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language
Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed t…
Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status
On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming
The Logic of Leibniz's Borrowed Reality Argument
Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this 'borrowed reality argument' has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness o…
Why Leibniz should have agreed with Berkeley about abstract ideas
Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract t…
Consent by residence
The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state i…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (4 works) · Agriculture Sustainability and Environmental Impact (2 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (2 works)