Paul Pecorino
Biographic Data
| ID | 1195902 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paul Pecorino |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paul |
| FAMILY NAME | Pecorino |
| SIGNATURE | PECORINO P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alabama |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7659-7873 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 24 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Social welfare and the group size paradox
Proposal convergence and settlement under final offer arbitration
Discovery in a screening model of final offer arbitration
A Comparison of the Female and Male Racial Disparities in Imprisonment
Discovery and Disclosure in a Signaling Model of Final-Offer Arbitration
We develop a signaling model of final-offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator, and if no agreement is reached the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted proposals. In the context of this model, we analyze costly voluntary disclosure and costly discovery. In standard litigation models, costly disclosure may occur i…
Disclosure and Discovery with fairness
Bridge burning and escape routes
Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: A synthesis
Individual welfare and the group size paradox
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty
Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry
Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision
In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for…
Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring
The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level
Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem
William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
Günther G. Schulze, The political economy of capital controls
Keynes on Taxation
Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game
Reversal of fortune: The politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider
Dani Rodrik, Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997. xi + 108 pages. $20.95 (cloth)
Exogenous tariff changes with an endogenous lobbying response
The Use of Final Offer Arbitration as a Screening Device
Arbitration outcomes are uncertain. When risk preferences are unobservable, players may make offers that attempt to extract the willingness of risk-averse bargaining partners to pay to avoid the uncertainties of arbitration. When such a “hard” offer is made to a risk-neutral bargaining partner, it will be refused and arbitration will result. This is true even when the distribution of outcomes is common knowledge. Importantly, risk preferences may…
Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty
The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level
Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
The Use of Final Offer Arbitration as a Screening Device
Arbitration outcomes are uncertain. When risk preferences are unobservable, players may make offers that attempt to extract the willingness of risk-averse bargaining partners to pay to avoid the uncertainties of arbitration. When such a “hard” offer is made to a risk-neutral bargaining partner, it will be refused and arbitration will result. This is true even when the distribution of outcomes is common knowledge. Importantly, risk preferences may…
Individual welfare and the group size paradox
Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry
Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision
In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for…
Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem
Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: A synthesis
Reversal of fortune: The politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider
Exogenous tariff changes with an endogenous lobbying response
The Use of Final Offer Arbitration as a Screening Device
Arbitration outcomes are uncertain. When risk preferences are unobservable, players may make offers that attempt to extract the willingness of risk-averse bargaining partners to pay to avoid the uncertainties of arbitration. When such a “hard” offer is made to a risk-neutral bargaining partner, it will be refused and arbitration will result. This is true even when the distribution of outcomes is common knowledge. Importantly, risk preferences may…
Exogenous tariff changes with an endogenous lobbying response
Dani Rodrik, Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997. xi + 108 pages. $20.95 (cloth)
Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game
Reversal of fortune: The politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider
Günther G. Schulze, The political economy of capital controls
Keynes on Taxation
William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem
The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level
Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring
Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry
Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision
In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for…
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty
Individual welfare and the group size paradox
Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: A synthesis
Disclosure and Discovery with fairness
Bridge burning and escape routes
Discovery and Disclosure in a Signaling Model of Final-Offer Arbitration
We develop a signaling model of final-offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator, and if no agreement is reached the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted proposals. In the context of this model, we analyze costly voluntary disclosure and costly discovery. In standard litigation models, costly disclosure may occur i…
Discovery in a screening model of final offer arbitration
A Comparison of the Female and Male Racial Disparities in Imprisonment
Proposal convergence and settlement under final offer arbitration
Social welfare and the group size paradox
Economics (23 works) · Microeconomics (16 works) · Political science (15 works) · Law (12 works) · Public finance (12 works) · Macroeconomics (11 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (6 works)