The Use of Final Offer Arbitration as a Screening Device
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284133 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amy Farmer Curry (University of Tennessee at Knoxville), Paul Pecorino (0000-0002-7659-7873, University of Mississippi) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 655-669 |
| Publication date | 1993-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002793037004004 |
| OpenAlex | W2050325503 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 14 |
Arbitration outcomes are uncertain. When risk preferences are unobservable, players may make offers that attempt to extract the willingness of risk-averse bargaining partners to pay to avoid the uncertainties of arbitration. When such a “hard” offer is made to a risk-neutral bargaining partner, it will be refused and arbitration will result. This is true even when the distribution of outcomes is common knowledge. Importantly, risk preferences may be difficult to communicate, even if it is in the interest of both parties to do so
Actuarial science · Arbitration · Business · Distribution (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Unobservable · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,21 |
| Citation span | 1997 - 2022 (26) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |