Katherine J Morris
Biographic Data
| ID | 1198569 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Katherine J Morris |
| GIVEN NAMES | Katherine J |
| FAMILY NAME | Morris |
| SIGNATURE | MORRIS K J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Mansfield University |
| ORCID | 0009-0005-1039-0529 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 50 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Sartre on the Body
Merleau-Ponty and ‘Out-of-Body Experiences’
(2003). Merleau-Ponty and ‘Out-of-Body Experiences’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 157-167
Pain, Injury and First/Third-Person Asymmetry
Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of exhibit 'first/third-person asymmetry', whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not.2 (That is, they claim that the 'logic' of, say, am in works very differently from that of He is in pain, whereas there is no such asymmetry between, say, am injured and He is injured.) The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as n…
The `Context Principle' in the Later Wittgenstein
Journal Article The ‘Context Principle’ in the Later Wittgenstein Get access Katherine J. Morris Katherine J. Morris Mansfield College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 176, July 1994, Pages 294–310, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219611 Published: 01 July 1994
Actions and the Body: Hornsby vs. Sartre
Jennifer Hornsby has advocated a theory of action which, as I will try to show, is incompatible with Sartre's phenomenological observations on the body. Hornsby's basic explicit presupposition is that actions are events;' the opposite view she deems strange. From a Sartrean perspective, Hornsby's theory is at least as strange: strange enough to make one think twice about the thesis that actions are events. It is doubtful that Hornsby herself woul…
Effects of need for cognition on message evaluation, recall, and persuasion
Effects of need for cognition on message evaluation, recall, and persuasion
The `Context Principle' in the Later Wittgenstein
Journal Article The ‘Context Principle’ in the Later Wittgenstein Get access Katherine J. Morris Katherine J. Morris Mansfield College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 176, July 1994, Pages 294–310, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219611 Published: 01 July 1994
Effects of need for cognition on message evaluation, recall, and persuasion
Actions and the Body: Hornsby vs. Sartre
Jennifer Hornsby has advocated a theory of action which, as I will try to show, is incompatible with Sartre's phenomenological observations on the body. Hornsby's basic explicit presupposition is that actions are events;' the opposite view she deems strange. From a Sartrean perspective, Hornsby's theory is at least as strange: strange enough to make one think twice about the thesis that actions are events. It is doubtful that Hornsby herself woul…
The `Context Principle' in the Later Wittgenstein
Journal Article The ‘Context Principle’ in the Later Wittgenstein Get access Katherine J. Morris Katherine J. Morris Mansfield College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 176, July 1994, Pages 294–310, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219611 Published: 01 July 1994
Pain, Injury and First/Third-Person Asymmetry
Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of exhibit 'first/third-person asymmetry', whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not.2 (That is, they claim that the 'logic' of, say, am in works very differently from that of He is in pain, whereas there is no such asymmetry between, say, am injured and He is injured.) The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as n…
Merleau-Ponty and ‘Out-of-Body Experiences’
(2003). Merleau-Ponty and ‘Out-of-Body Experiences’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 157-167
Sartre on the Body
Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychoanalysis (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (2 works) · Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 works) · Art (1 works) · Art history (1 works)