Actions and the Body
Hornsby vs. Sartre
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345296 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Katherine J Morris (0009-0005-1039-0529, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 473-473 |
| Publication date | 1988-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2107474 |
| OpenAlex | W2314246558 |
| Language | EN |
Jennifer Hornsby has advocated a theory of action which, as I will try to show, is incompatible with Sartre's phenomenological observations on the body. Hornsby's basic explicit presupposition is that actions are events;' the opposite view she deems strange. From a Sartrean perspective, Hornsby's theory is at least as strange: strange enough to make one think twice about the thesis that actions are events. It is doubtful that Hornsby herself would be impressed by these Sartrean criticisms. Some people, she writes
Psychoanalysis · Ethics in medical practice · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |