Gary E Bolton
Biographic Data
| ID | 1199784 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gary E Bolton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gary E |
| FAMILY NAME | Bolton |
| SIGNATURE | BOLTON G E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Pennsylvania State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6393-9478 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 39 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Moves, motives, and words: Introduction to the special issue on bargaining process
Norm Enforcement in Markets: Group Identity and the Volunteering of Feedback
The provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a…
Behavioral economic engineering
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution
Individuals, groups, and societies all experience conflict, and attempt to resolve it in numerous ways. The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution brings together scholars from multiple disciplines to offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. It aims to act as an aid in identifying new research topics. It hopes also to provide a guide to current debates and identify complementar…
Pricing Favors: Some Evidence on the Efficiency of Backscratching
Backscratching is the trading of favors and the economic basis of much of the informal cooperation that goes on inside organizations and in society. The experiment we present investigates the efficiency of backscratching. We find that people are, for the most part, good at coordinating the exchange of favors, even when restricted to tacit bargaining, and even when there is an asymmetry to the payoffs of the favors exchanged. Transactions neverthe…
Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries
Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. "Post hoc" extension of one of the current models …
How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation
Electronic reputation or “feedback” mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another's dealings. In this paper, we compare trading in a market with online feedback (as implemented by many Internet markets) to a market without feedback, as well as to a market in whic…
Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach
Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller’s morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers’ intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the inter…
Reanalyzing Ultimatum Bargaining—Comparing Nondecreasing Curves Without Shape Constraints
We employ a hierarchical Bayesian method with exchangeable prior distributions to estimate and compare similar nondecreasing response curves. A Dirichlet process distribution is assigned to each of the response curves as a first stage prior. A second stage prior is then used to model the hyperparameters. We define parameters which will be used to compare the response curves. A Markov chain Monte Carlo method is applied to compute the resulting Ba…
Erc: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, …
Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
Analyzing Ultimatum Bargaining: A Bayesian Approach to the Comparison of Two Potency Curves Under Shape Constraints
An experiment designed to test whether experimenter observation influences play of the ultimatum game led to a comparison of proportions of perfect equilibria obtained under different conditions. Our analysis features a Bayesian approach to this comparison. Our method extends recent work in the nonparametric Bayesian analysis of bioassay problems when the prior constrains the form of the potency curve. Sampling-based approaches to calculating pos…
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries
Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. "Post hoc" extension of one of the current models …
Behavioral economic engineering
Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach
Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller’s morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers’ intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the inter…
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution
Individuals, groups, and societies all experience conflict, and attempt to resolve it in numerous ways. The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution brings together scholars from multiple disciplines to offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. It aims to act as an aid in identifying new research topics. It hopes also to provide a guide to current debates and identify complementar…
Norm Enforcement in Markets: Group Identity and the Volunteering of Feedback
The provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a…
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
Analyzing Ultimatum Bargaining: A Bayesian Approach to the Comparison of Two Potency Curves Under Shape Constraints
An experiment designed to test whether experimenter observation influences play of the ultimatum game led to a comparison of proportions of perfect equilibria obtained under different conditions. Our analysis features a Bayesian approach to this comparison. Our method extends recent work in the nonparametric Bayesian analysis of bioassay problems when the prior constrains the form of the potency curve. Sampling-based approaches to calculating pos…
Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
Erc: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, …
Reanalyzing Ultimatum Bargaining—Comparing Nondecreasing Curves Without Shape Constraints
We employ a hierarchical Bayesian method with exchangeable prior distributions to estimate and compare similar nondecreasing response curves. A Dirichlet process distribution is assigned to each of the response curves as a first stage prior. A second stage prior is then used to model the hyperparameters. We define parameters which will be used to compare the response curves. A Markov chain Monte Carlo method is applied to compute the resulting Ba…
How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation
Electronic reputation or “feedback” mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another's dealings. In this paper, we compare trading in a market with online feedback (as implemented by many Internet markets) to a market without feedback, as well as to a market in whic…
Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach
Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller’s morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers’ intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the inter…
Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries
Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. "Post hoc" extension of one of the current models …
Pricing Favors: Some Evidence on the Efficiency of Backscratching
Backscratching is the trading of favors and the economic basis of much of the informal cooperation that goes on inside organizations and in society. The experiment we present investigates the efficiency of backscratching. We find that people are, for the most part, good at coordinating the exchange of favors, even when restricted to tacit bargaining, and even when there is an asymmetry to the payoffs of the favors exchanged. Transactions neverthe…
Behavioral economic engineering
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution
Individuals, groups, and societies all experience conflict, and attempt to resolve it in numerous ways. The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution brings together scholars from multiple disciplines to offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. It aims to act as an aid in identifying new research topics. It hopes also to provide a guide to current debates and identify complementar…
Norm Enforcement in Markets: Group Identity and the Volunteering of Feedback
The provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a…
Moves, motives, and words: Introduction to the special issue on bargaining process
Economics (10 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (10 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works)