Jonathan David Cottrell
Biographic Data
| ID | 1201667 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan David Cottrell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan David |
| FAMILY NAME | Cottrell |
| SIGNATURE | COTTRELL J D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Wayne State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0205-7601 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Representation and Copying in Hume’s Treatise and Later Works
Some of Hume’s central arguments in the Treatise—for example, arguments about causality, the self, and motivation—concern which of our perceptions represent, and what these perceptions can and cannot represent. A growing body of literature aims to reconstruct the theory of mental representation that (it is presumed) underwrites these arguments. The most popular type of interpretation says that, according to Hume’s theory, copying plays a signific…
Unperceived Existence and Hume’s Theory of Ideas
Hume seems committed to an inconsistent triad: (i) we believe certain things to exist unperceived; (ii) if we believe a certain thing to exist unperceived, then we have (at our disposal) an idea that represents it as existing unperceived; and (iii) we do not have (at our disposal) an idea that represents anything as existing unperceived. This chapter aims to acquit him of this seeming inconsistency by arguing that, contrary to what others have cl…
Hume on mental representation and intentionality
The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, ind…
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Hume on mental representation and intentionality
Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation
This is a rich, ambitious, and original study. Graciela De Pierris aims to give a new account of the relationship between Hume's skepticism and his naturalism. Notoriously, Hume gives skeptical arguments targeting our best methods of inquiry, such as inductive reasoning. So, how can he—in good intellectual conscience—endorse and rely on those very methods, in his own naturalistic investigation of the human mind (his “science of man”)? Some schola…
Minds, Composition, and Hume's Skepticism in the Appendix
This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions. But—this essay argues—he also held that several perceptions form a whole only if the mind to which they belong supplies a “connexion” among them. In order to do so, it must …
Hume on mental representation and intentionality
The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, ind…
Minds, Composition, and Hume's Skepticism in the Appendix
This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions. But—this essay argues—he also held that several perceptions form a whole only if the mind to which they belong supplies a “connexion” among them. In order to do so, it must …
Minds, Composition, and Hume's Skepticism in the Appendix
This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions. But—this essay argues—he also held that several perceptions form a whole only if the mind to which they belong supplies a “connexion” among them. In order to do so, it must …
Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation
This is a rich, ambitious, and original study. Graciela De Pierris aims to give a new account of the relationship between Hume's skepticism and his naturalism. Notoriously, Hume gives skeptical arguments targeting our best methods of inquiry, such as inductive reasoning. So, how can he—in good intellectual conscience—endorse and rely on those very methods, in his own naturalistic investigation of the human mind (his “science of man”)? Some schola…
Hume on mental representation and intentionality
The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, ind…
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Hume on mental representation and intentionality
Unperceived Existence and Hume’s Theory of Ideas
Hume seems committed to an inconsistent triad: (i) we believe certain things to exist unperceived; (ii) if we believe a certain thing to exist unperceived, then we have (at our disposal) an idea that represents it as existing unperceived; and (iii) we do not have (at our disposal) an idea that represents anything as existing unperceived. This chapter aims to acquit him of this seeming inconsistency by arguing that, contrary to what others have cl…
Representation and Copying in Hume’s Treatise and Later Works
Some of Hume’s central arguments in the Treatise—for example, arguments about causality, the self, and motivation—concern which of our perceptions represent, and what these perceptions can and cannot represent. A growing body of literature aims to reconstruct the theory of mental representation that (it is presumed) underwrites these arguments. The most popular type of interpretation says that, according to Hume’s theory, copying plays a signific…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Hume's philosophy and hair distribution (2 works) · Interpretation (philosophy) (2 works) · Mental state (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Skepticism (2 works)