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Hume on mental representation and intentionality

Bibliographic Data

ID5016433
AuthorsJonathan David Cottrell (0000-0003-0205-7601)
Year2018
Volume13
Issue7
Publication date2018-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12505
OpenAlexW2802972729
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited24

The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, individually, peculiar to representational or intentional things. Second, Hume holds that the passions are not representational but do have intentionality extrinsically

Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Intentionality · Mental representation · Mental state · Passions · Politics · Representation (politics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Philosophy

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    Open Access•Elizabeth G Jackson, Elizabeth Jackson•Mind•2021

  • Feasibility as a Constraint on ‘Ought All-Things-Considered’, But not on ‘Ought as a Matter of Justice’

    Open Access•Nicholas Southwood•The Philosophical Quarterly•2019

  • Representation and Copying in Hume’s Treatise and Later Works

    Open Access•Jonathan David Cottrell, Jonathan Cottrell•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2021

  • Addressing inequal risk exposure in the development of automated vehicles

    Open Access•Manuel Dietrich•Ethics and Information Technology•2021

  • Infeasibility as a normative argument‐stopper

    Open Access•Nicholas Southwood, Robert E Goodin•European Journal of Philosophy•2021

  • Recognition and the perception–cognition divide

    Open Access•Greyson Abid•Mind & Language•2022

  • Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing

    Open Access•Anita Brenner•Erkenntnis•2022

  • Gratitude Is Only Fittingly Targeted Towards Agents

    Open Access•Marcus William Hunt•Sophia•2022

  • The problem of insignificant hands

    Open Access•Frank Hindriks•Philosophical Studies•2022

  • The possibility of wildly unrealistic justice and the principle/proposal distinction

    Open Access•Nicholas Southwood•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • No fact of the middle

    Open Access•Jill Khoo, Justin Khoo•Noûs•2022

  • Fitting prepositional gratitude to god is metaphysically impossible

    Open Access•Marcus William Hunt•International Journal for…•2021

  • Justice, emotions, and solidarity

    Open Access•Francesco Tava•Critical Review of International…•2021

  • Compensatory justice and the wrongs of deportation

    Juan Espindola•Critical Review of International…•2021

  • Impressions and Ideas

    Janet Broughton•The Blackwell Guide to Hume's…•2006

  • The Powers and Mechanisms of the Passions

    Lilli Alanen•The Blackwell Guide to Hume's…•2006

  • Hume-Arg Philosophers

    Barry Stroud•Hume-Arg Philosophers•2003

  • Psychosemantics

    Jerry A Fodor•Psychosemantics•1987

  • David Hume

    David Hume, P H Nidditch•Enquiries concerning human…•1975

  • Hume's 'A Treatise of Human Nature'

    Open Access•John Wright, John P Wright•Hume's 'a Treatise of Human Nature'•2009

  • Hume's Theory of Consciousness

    Open Access•Wayne Waxman•Hume's Theory of Consciousness•1994

  • Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism

    Open Access•Michael B Gill•Philosophy Compass•2007

  • Hume’s naturalistic theory of representation

    Open Access•Don Garrett•Synthese•2006

  • The simple duality

    Open Access•Haitao Qu•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2012

  • Hume’s True Scepticism

    Donald C Ainslie•Hume's True Scepticism•2015

  • Kant's Inferentialism

    David Landy•Kant's Inferentialism•2015

Unique citing works14
Citations per year2
Citation span2019 - 2022 (4)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 14

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