William Hasker
Biographic Data
| ID | 1206119 |
|---|---|
| NAME | William Hasker |
| GIVEN NAMES | William |
| FAMILY NAME | Hasker |
| SIGNATURE | HASKER W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Huntington University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9892-3633 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 41 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 41 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1970 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Swinburne’s theodicy: “On justifying why God permits horrendous suffering”
Constitution, identity, and the Trinity: Rebuttal to Leftow
Brian Leftow continues to argue that the metaphysical concept of constitution cannot be used to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity, as I have attempted to do. He also defends his own, distinctive view of the relation of Jesus to the Father. I maintain that he fails on both counts
Future truth and freedom
The Trinity as social and constitutional: A rejoinder to Brian Leftow
Brian Leftow continues to argue against my use of the constitution relation in explaining the Trinity. I consider his arguments, and have a bit more to say about Leftow's own formulation of trinitarian doctrine
Constituting the Trinity
Recently several authors have developed accounts of the Trinity employing the metaphysical notion of constitution. I expound one such proposal and defend it against objections from Keith Yandell and Brian Leftow. In the process, I propose an improved definition of the constitution relation as applied to the Trinity. I then compare the resulting trinitarian metaphysics with Leftow's own view
Afterthoughts
Who’s right about rights
James Sterba's New Argument from Evil
This article addresses the main argument in James Sterba's book, an argument which claims that the existence of a good God is logically incompatible with the evil in the world. I claim to show that his main premise, MEPRI, is implausible and is not a secure foundation for such an argument
The Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker
A compositional incarnation
This article expounds and defends a compositional view of the incarnation, in which the eternal divine Son assumes a human body and soul as parts of himself. Objections to the view are answered, and it is argued that it is superior to other metaphysical accounts of the incarnation
Philosophical Arminianism: A breakthrough in the foreknowledge controversy
Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a novel approach to the topics of divine foreknowledge and providence, a view he terms ‘Philosophical Arminianism’. This article expounds and assesses the view; it is maintained that there are at least two major difficulties that have yet to be addressed
Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay 'On the Trinity
Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom
This article focuses on the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, which has been the most discussed problem in this area in recent philosophy. It begins with a formal statement of the standard historical argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will, an argument based on the idea that if God has foreknowledge of all future events and God's foreknowledge is infallible, then agents cannot act other than t…
The Many Gods of Hick and Mavrodes
George Mavrodes has argued, on the basis of John Hick’s An Interpretation of Religion, that Hick is ‘probably the most important philosophical defender of polytheism in the history of Western philosophy’. Hick, however, denies that this description properly applies to him. This paper concludes that insofar as Hick maintains the Kantian-constructivist view of the divine personae and impersonae that is predominant in the Interpretation, he is abl…
Deception and the Trinity: A rejoinder to Tuggy
Dale Tuggy argues that his divine-deception argument against Social Trinitarianism remains unscathed, in spite of my recent objections. I maintain that his argument is question-begging and exegetically weak, and does not succeed in refuting Social Trinitarianism
Defining ‘gratuitous evil’: A response to Alan R. Rhoda
In his article, ‘Gratuitous evil and divine providence’, Alan Rhoda claims to have produced an uncontroversial theological premise for the evidential argument from evil. I argue that his premise is by no means uncontroversial among theists, and I doubt that any premise can be found that is both uncontroversial and useful for the argument from evil
Objections to Social Trinitarianism
This article reviews a number of objections to Social Trinitarianism that have been presented in the recent literature, especially objections alleging that Social Trinitarianism is not truly monotheistic. A number of the objections are found to be successful so far as they go, but they apply only to some versions of Social Trinitarianism and not to all. Objections to Social Trinitarianism as such, on the other hand, are not successful. The articl…
Intelligent Design
The intelligent design movement aspires to create a new scientific paradigm which will replace the existing Darwinian paradigm of evolution by random mutation and natural selection. However, the creation of such a paradigm is hampered by the fact that the movement pursues a 'big tent' strategy that refuses to make a choice between young-earth creationism, old-earth (progressive) creationism, and divinely directed natural selection. The latter two…
Can God Be Free: Rowe's dilemma for theology
In his book, Can God Be Free? , William Rowe has argued that if God is unsurpassably good He cannot be free; if He is free, He cannot be unsurpassably good. After following the discussion of this topic through a number of historical figures, Rowe focuses on the recent and contemporary debate. A key claim of Rowe's is that, if there exists an endless series of better and better creatable worlds, then the existence of a morally perfect creator is i…
Is free-will theism religiously inadequate? A reply to Ciocchi
David Ciocchi has charged that ‘open’ or free-will theism is religiously inadequate. This is it is because it is unable to affirm the ‘presumption of divine intervention in response to petitionary prayer’ (PDI), a presumption Ciocchi claims is implicit in the religious practice of ordinary Christian believers. I argue that PDI and Ciocchi's other assumptions concerning prayer are too strong, and would upon reflection be rejected by most believers…
Is Christianity probable? Swinburne's apologetic programme
Richard Swinburne's tetralogy on Christian doctrine, together with his earlier trilogy on the philosophy of theism, is one of the most important apologetic projects of recent times. This paper focuses on some difficulties with this project that stem from Swinburne's use of confirmation theory. Arguably, the problem of dwindling probabilities, pointed out by Plantinga, has not been solved. The paper is principally focused, however, on the ways in …
Are alternative pasts plausible? A reply to Thomas Flint
Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a ‘seemingly irreparable logical gap’. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that ‘something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past’. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for r…
A new anti-Molinist argument
An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the…
Christianity and Philosophy
Part One: Articles
James Sterba's New Argument from Evil
This article addresses the main argument in James Sterba's book, an argument which claims that the existence of a good God is logically incompatible with the evil in the world. I claim to show that his main premise, MEPRI, is implausible and is not a secure foundation for such an argument
Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Reply to William Craig
According to William Craig, the notion of explanatory priority is the Achilles' heel of Robert Adams' argument against Molinism. Specifically, Craig contends that (1) the notion of explanatory priority is employed equivocally in the argument; (2) Adams is guilty of conflating reasons and causes; and (3) one of the intermediate conclusions of the argument is invalidly inferred, as can be seen by a counterexample. I argue that Craig is mistaken on …
Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil
claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my essay, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil." I point out that Chrzan misstates
The Hardness of the Past: A Reply to Reichenbach
Tri-Unity
The Souls of Beasts and Men
‘The organic body signifies the latent crisis of every known ontology and the touchstone of “any future one which will be able to come forward as a science.”’ —Hans Jonas ‘Thales...said that the magnet has a soul in it because it moves the iron.’— Aristotle
The Critique of “Mental Illness”: Conceptual and/or Ethical Crisis
Thomas Szasz’ critique of the concept of mental illness centers on the claims that (a) mental illness is diagnosed on the basis of objective medical criteria, and (b) mental illness is something which happens to the patient rather than something done by him. Neither of these claims, according to Szasz, is true: mental illness, in this sense, is a “myth.” Various attempts to meet Szasz’ critique and to define mental illness are examined and found …
The God of the Philosophers
Emergentism
Great philosophical problems are known by their power to rise, phoenix-like, from the ashes of their own dissolution. Indeed, it may be only thus that we are finally convinced of the enduring significance of a problem. The mind-body problem has been dissolved at least twice in the last fifty years: once by the positivists, and again by the therapeutic analysts. Yet it strongly re-asserts itself, so that it is barely a hyperbole when Wilfrid Sella…
Foreknowledge and Necessity
The Hardness of the Past: A Reply to Reichenbach
Yes, God has Beliefs
It is beyond question that most ordinary religious believers would find talk about God as having beliefs strange, puzzling, and objectionable. God doesn't believe things, he knows them, and if some philosophers, overlooking or ignoring this obvious point, still speak of God as having beliefs – well, that says something about those philosophers! Recently this view of the ordinary believer has received help from an unexpected source, namely William…
The Possibility of an All-Knowing God
Providence and Evil: Three Theories
The last two decades have seen an unprecedented amount of philosophical work on the topics of divine foreknowledge, middle knowledge, and timelessness in relation to human freedom. Most of this effort has been directed at logical and metaphysical aspects of these topics – the compatibility of foreknowledge with free will, the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom and the possibility of middle knowledge, the conceivability and metaphysical …
God, Time and Knowledge
Gale on God: The Return of Philo
Richard Gale, noting the “startling resurgence of theism within philosophy during the past thirty years or so” (p. 2) led by William Alston, Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne, concludes that “there is need for a return visit from Hume's Philo.” But fans of Philo may be disappointed with the present version. To be sure, Gale as Philo possesses both the wit and the critical acumen to make him a worthy successor to the original. What is lacking,…
Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited
Faith and Philosophy(2) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world than are particular facts.(Hence, worlds which differ from the actual world with regard to factual content are closer than those which differ from it with regard to counterfactuals of freedom.)
Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil
claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my essay, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil." I point out that Chrzan misstates
Christianity and Philosophy
Part One: Articles
Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Reply to William Craig
According to William Craig, the notion of explanatory priority is the Achilles' heel of Robert Adams' argument against Molinism. Specifically, Craig contends that (1) the notion of explanatory priority is employed equivocally in the argument; (2) Adams is guilty of conflating reasons and causes; and (3) one of the intermediate conclusions of the argument is invalidly inferred, as can be seen by a counterexample. I argue that Craig is mistaken on …
The Christian God. Richard Swinburne
A new anti-Molinist argument
An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the…
Are alternative pasts plausible? A reply to Thomas Flint
Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a ‘seemingly irreparable logical gap’. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that ‘something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past’. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for r…
Is Christianity probable? Swinburne's apologetic programme
Richard Swinburne's tetralogy on Christian doctrine, together with his earlier trilogy on the philosophy of theism, is one of the most important apologetic projects of recent times. This paper focuses on some difficulties with this project that stem from Swinburne's use of confirmation theory. Arguably, the problem of dwindling probabilities, pointed out by Plantinga, has not been solved. The paper is principally focused, however, on the ways in …
Is free-will theism religiously inadequate? A reply to Ciocchi
David Ciocchi has charged that ‘open’ or free-will theism is religiously inadequate. This is it is because it is unable to affirm the ‘presumption of divine intervention in response to petitionary prayer’ (PDI), a presumption Ciocchi claims is implicit in the religious practice of ordinary Christian believers. I argue that PDI and Ciocchi's other assumptions concerning prayer are too strong, and would upon reflection be rejected by most believers…
Can God Be Free: Rowe's dilemma for theology
In his book, Can God Be Free? , William Rowe has argued that if God is unsurpassably good He cannot be free; if He is free, He cannot be unsurpassably good. After following the discussion of this topic through a number of historical figures, Rowe focuses on the recent and contemporary debate. A key claim of Rowe's is that, if there exists an endless series of better and better creatable worlds, then the existence of a morally perfect creator is i…
Intelligent Design
The intelligent design movement aspires to create a new scientific paradigm which will replace the existing Darwinian paradigm of evolution by random mutation and natural selection. However, the creation of such a paradigm is hampered by the fact that the movement pursues a 'big tent' strategy that refuses to make a choice between young-earth creationism, old-earth (progressive) creationism, and divinely directed natural selection. The latter two…
Defining ‘gratuitous evil’: A response to Alan R. Rhoda
In his article, ‘Gratuitous evil and divine providence’, Alan Rhoda claims to have produced an uncontroversial theological premise for the evidential argument from evil. I argue that his premise is by no means uncontroversial among theists, and I doubt that any premise can be found that is both uncontroversial and useful for the argument from evil
Philosophy (38 works) · Epistemology (32 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (22 works) · Theology (14 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (7 works) · Contemporary philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works)