Julius Schönherr
Biographic Data
| ID | 1217725 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julius Schönherr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julius |
| FAMILY NAME | Schönherr |
| SIGNATURE | SCHÖNHERR J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Peking University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2613-3659 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Forgiveness
Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either overcoming or forswearing blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many paradigm cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the …
Trust and inquiry
This paper analyzes the relationship between trust and inquiry to argue for the view that A trusts B to act in some way only if A believes, in a way that she cannot distinguish from knowledge, for reasons of trust, that B will (or has) act(ed) in this way. Call such beliefs ‘outright trusting beliefs’. To support this view, I shall argue, by way of various examples, that the conditions under which inquiry erodes trust are the same as the conditio…
Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment
Believing on eggshells
This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice: the injustice that occurs when prejudice causes someone to know less than they otherwise would. This encroachment injustice , as we call it, occurs when the threat of being met with prejudice raises the stakes for someone to rely on her belief when acting, by rais…
Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause
Salience reasoning in coordination games
Beyond ‘Interaction’
In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task. …
When Forgiveness Comes Easy
Still Lives for Headaches
There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life proje…
Still Lives for Headaches
There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life proje…
Beyond ‘Interaction’
In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task. …
Still Lives for Headaches
There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life proje…
When Forgiveness Comes Easy
Beyond ‘Interaction’
In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task. …
Salience reasoning in coordination games
Believing on eggshells
This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice: the injustice that occurs when prejudice causes someone to know less than they otherwise would. This encroachment injustice , as we call it, occurs when the threat of being met with prejudice raises the stakes for someone to rely on her belief when acting, by rais…
Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause
Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment
Forgiveness
Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either overcoming or forswearing blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many paradigm cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the …
Trust and inquiry
This paper analyzes the relationship between trust and inquiry to argue for the view that A trusts B to act in some way only if A believes, in a way that she cannot distinguish from knowledge, for reasons of trust, that B will (or has) act(ed) in this way. Call such beliefs ‘outright trusting beliefs’. To support this view, I shall argue, by way of various examples, that the conditions under which inquiry erodes trust are the same as the conditio…
Psychology (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works)