Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Biographic Data
| ID | 1220937 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding |
| FAMILY NAME | Pedersen |
| SIGNATURE | PEDERSEN N J L L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yonsei University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 3 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Playing and asserting
Is the epistemic norm governing assertion essential to assertion? Is the norm constitutive of the very nature of the speech act? Some say it cannot be so because assertion patterns very differently than playing games when it comes to breaking constitutive rules. You can break the rule of assertion in various ways and still assert, but you cannot break the rules of games in just that way and still assert. We should then conclude that the epistemic…
The phenomenal evidence argument
The self saves the day! Value pluralism, autonomous belief and the dissolution of the value problem through the encroachment of the self on knowledge
In his book Autonomous Knowledge J. Adam Carter argues that the possibility of radical cognitive enhancement shows the need for epistemology to be significantly updated. Reflection on the possibility of such enhancement shows that doxastic autonomy matters. If a belief fails to be autonomous, it cannot qualify as knowledge. Sects. 1-3 of this paper introduce the key components of Carter's autonomy framework and his considerations on the value of …
The problem of mixed beings
Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and Normativity
Logic has traditionally been considered a normative discipline in that it is taken to guide us in deductive reasoning. There is currently an intense debate over how exactly logic's normative role o
Pluralisms in Truth and Logic
Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: An argument against (strong) non-conformism
Epistemic Pluralism
On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance
Rational trust
The epistemology of absence-based inference
The epistemology of inclusiveness
Epistemic transmission and interaction
New Waves in Truth
Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism
Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T1 ... Tn). A simple argument, the ‘instability challenge’, purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T1 or ... or Tn. Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform acr…
Entitlement, value and rationality
Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism
Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T1 ... Tn). A simple argument, the ‘instability challenge’, purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T1 or ... or Tn. Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform acr…
On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance
Entitlement, value and rationality
The epistemology of absence-based inference
Entitlement, value and rationality
New Waves in Truth
Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism
Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T1 ... Tn). A simple argument, the ‘instability challenge’, purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T1 or ... or Tn. Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform acr…
The epistemology of absence-based inference
The epistemology of inclusiveness
Epistemic transmission and interaction
On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance
Rational trust
Epistemic Pluralism
Pluralisms in Truth and Logic
Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: An argument against (strong) non-conformism
Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and Normativity
Logic has traditionally been considered a normative discipline in that it is taken to guide us in deductive reasoning. There is currently an intense debate over how exactly logic's normative role o
The problem of mixed beings
The self saves the day! Value pluralism, autonomous belief and the dissolution of the value problem through the encroachment of the self on knowledge
In his book Autonomous Knowledge J. Adam Carter argues that the possibility of radical cognitive enhancement shows the need for epistemology to be significantly updated. Reflection on the possibility of such enhancement shows that doxastic autonomy matters. If a belief fails to be autonomous, it cannot qualify as knowledge. Sects. 1-3 of this paper introduce the key components of Carter's autonomy framework and his considerations on the value of …
Playing and asserting
Is the epistemic norm governing assertion essential to assertion? Is the norm constitutive of the very nature of the speech act? Some say it cannot be so because assertion patterns very differently than playing games when it comes to breaking constitutive rules. You can break the rule of assertion in various ways and still assert, but you cannot break the rules of games in just that way and still assert. We should then conclude that the epistemic…
The phenomenal evidence argument
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Metaphysics (9 works) · Philosophy of language (9 works) · Philosophy of science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy of mind (4 works) · Pluralism (philosophy) (4 works)