Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism

Bibliographic Data

ID4351292
AuthorsNikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author), Nikolaj Jang Pedersen
Year2010
Volume60
Issue238
Pages92-108
Publication date2010-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.605.x
OpenAlexW2063753489
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited12

Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T1 ... Tn). A simple argument, the ‘instability challenge’, purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T1 or ... or Tn. Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform across domains, contra pluralism. I defend pluralism against the instability challenge. I show that the challenge bifurcates: one challenge is formulated in terms of predicates, and the other is formulated in terms of properties. The pluralist has the resources to defuse both of these. The sparse/abundant property distinction and considerations of explanatory asymmetry play a crucial role in my argument

Argument (complex analysis) · Asymmetry · Epistemology · Instability · Physics · Pluralism (philosophy) · Property (philosophy) · Quantum mechanics · Simple (philosophy) · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History

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