The Alethic Platitudes, Deflationism, and Adverbial Quantification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351739 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bradley Armour-Garb, Bradley Armour‐garb (0000-0002-1351-3230, University at Albany, State University of New York), James A Woodbridge (0000-0001-9248-1021, University of Nevada, Las Vegas) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 323-345 |
| Publication date | 2023-03-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqac061 |
| OpenAlex | W4297359539 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 42 |
Alethic pluralists often claim that accommodating certain alethic platitudes motivates rejecting deflationism in favour of a pluralist inflationism about truth. Deflationists claim that the logical role of the truth predicate, viz providing something equivalent to variables for sentence-in-use positions and quantifiers governing them, is sufficient to account for the appeal to truth in the alethic platitudes. Surprisingly, however, most deflationists face an insufficiently acknowledged problem with respect to explaining how this mode of generalizing works. The standard substitutional or higher-order interpretations of sentential quantifiers and variables do not meet two desiderata that we claim any adequate account of them must satisfy. To address this issue, we review and extend A. N. Prior's adverbial understanding of sentential quantification, explain how it satisfies the desiderata, and respond to some objections. This shows that deflationists can accommodate and account for the alethic platitudes by applying this non-nominal understanding of generalizing on sentence positions
Adverbial · Appeal · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Linguistics · Political science · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Sentence · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
Truth as One and Many
Understanding Truth
To Be is to be a Value of a Variable (or to be Some Values of Some Variables)
Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content
The Encyclopedia of philosophy
X.—Definitions, Rules and Axioms
Three Questions for Truth Pluralism
What is Truth?
Truth
Thought and World
Being, Identity, and Truth
Conceptions of Truth
Truth __ Meaning __ Reality
Context and the Attitudes
ReWrighting Pluralism
Deflationism and the Function of Truth
On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth
Paul Horwich's Truth
Conceptions of Truth
Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |