Christian Kietzmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 1232175 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christian Kietzmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christian |
| FAMILY NAME | Kietzmann |
| SIGNATURE | KIETZMANN C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0049-6048 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
What Does Aristotle’s Craftsperson Understand
I argue for the claim that for Aristotle, the content of productive understanding primarily concerns the nature of the object a craftsperson aims to bring into existence as well as its material requirements, and only derivatively things she might do with a view to producing that object. I explain why technê is a form of understanding, by considering what it shares with and how it differs from its practical and theoretical cousins. I give four arg…
Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart
In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premis…
Can realists reason with reasons
I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain some assumptions I make concerning reasoning, and show…
Inference Is Not a Process
Inference, understood as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has recently attracted much interest among philosophers of mind. Many writings on the topic depict inference as a kind of process. However, this assumption is, to my knowledge, nowhere explicitly justified or even reflected upon. In this paper, I argue that the assumption is wrong: while processes take time, it is not possible that inferences take time. Both claims are conce…
Teleological Structures in Human Life
Practical knowledge and error in action
G.E.M. Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge raises a puzzle for cases of practical error, i.e. cases where, due to a mistake of mine, I am not in fact doing what I mean to be doing. It can seem that in such cases, we must both affirm and deny the presence of practical knowledge. It must be present, because practical error presupposes that there is an intentional action in which the mistake occurs, which in turn presupposes practical knowledg…
Aristotle on the Definition of What It Is to Be Human
According to a philosophical commonplace, Aristotle defined human beings as rational animals. When one takes a closer look at the surviving texts, however, it is surprisingly hard to find such a definition. Of course, Aristotle repeatedly stresses that he regards rationality as the crucial differentiating characteristic of human beings, but he nowhere defines the essence of what it is to be human in these terms. What is more, Aristotle's abundant…
Evidence and Agency
Ethik und menschliche Natur
Spätestens seit dem Erscheinen von Anselm W. Müllers Was taugt die Tugend? (1998), Rosalind Hursthouses On Virtue Ethics (1999) und Philippa Foots Natural Goodness (2000) gilt der Aristotelische Naturalismus als eine ernstzunehmende metaethische Alternative. Mit etwas Verspätung kommt auch hierzulande eine Debatte um diese Position in Gang. Das belegen nicht nur deutsche Übersetzungen einiger wichtiger Primärtexte, sondern auch drei deutschsprach…
Aufsätze
Aufsätze
Practical knowledge and error in action
G.E.M. Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge raises a puzzle for cases of practical error, i.e. cases where, due to a mistake of mine, I am not in fact doing what I mean to be doing. It can seem that in such cases, we must both affirm and deny the presence of practical knowledge. It must be present, because practical error presupposes that there is an intentional action in which the mistake occurs, which in turn presupposes practical knowledg…
Aufsätze
Aufsätze
Ethik und menschliche Natur
Spätestens seit dem Erscheinen von Anselm W. Müllers Was taugt die Tugend? (1998), Rosalind Hursthouses On Virtue Ethics (1999) und Philippa Foots Natural Goodness (2000) gilt der Aristotelische Naturalismus als eine ernstzunehmende metaethische Alternative. Mit etwas Verspätung kommt auch hierzulande eine Debatte um diese Position in Gang. Das belegen nicht nur deutsche Übersetzungen einiger wichtiger Primärtexte, sondern auch drei deutschsprach…
Aristotle on the Definition of What It Is to Be Human
According to a philosophical commonplace, Aristotle defined human beings as rational animals. When one takes a closer look at the surviving texts, however, it is surprisingly hard to find such a definition. Of course, Aristotle repeatedly stresses that he regards rationality as the crucial differentiating characteristic of human beings, but he nowhere defines the essence of what it is to be human in these terms. What is more, Aristotle's abundant…
Evidence and Agency
Practical knowledge and error in action
G.E.M. Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge raises a puzzle for cases of practical error, i.e. cases where, due to a mistake of mine, I am not in fact doing what I mean to be doing. It can seem that in such cases, we must both affirm and deny the presence of practical knowledge. It must be present, because practical error presupposes that there is an intentional action in which the mistake occurs, which in turn presupposes practical knowledg…
Can realists reason with reasons
I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain some assumptions I make concerning reasoning, and show…
Inference Is Not a Process
Inference, understood as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has recently attracted much interest among philosophers of mind. Many writings on the topic depict inference as a kind of process. However, this assumption is, to my knowledge, nowhere explicitly justified or even reflected upon. In this paper, I argue that the assumption is wrong: while processes take time, it is not possible that inferences take time. Both claims are conce…
Teleological Structures in Human Life
Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart
In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premis…
What Does Aristotle’s Craftsperson Understand
I argue for the claim that for Aristotle, the content of productive understanding primarily concerns the nature of the object a craftsperson aims to bring into existence as well as its material requirements, and only derivatively things she might do with a view to producing that object. I explain why technê is a form of understanding, by considering what it shares with and how it differs from its practical and theoretical cousins. I give four arg…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)