Inference Is Not a Process
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293580 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian Kietzmann (0000-0002-0049-6048, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 539-549 |
| Publication date | 2022-07-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2021.1962928 |
| OpenAlex | W3209627356 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 22 |
Inference, understood as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has recently attracted much interest among philosophers of mind. Many writings on the topic depict inference as a kind of process. However, this assumption is, to my knowledge, nowhere explicitly justified or even reflected upon. In this paper, I argue that the assumption is wrong: while processes take time, it is not possible that inferences take time. Both claims are conceptual observations. It is therefore conceptually impossible that the mental act of inferring is a process
Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Inference · Mental model · Mental process · Process (computing) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |