Brian Kogelmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 1242785 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brian Kogelmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brian |
| FAMILY NAME | Kogelmann |
| SIGNATURE | KOGELMANN B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Arizona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9672-6989 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 32 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 31 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Ideology vs. Collective Action
Sortition and cognitive ability
There is a growing sense that representative democracy is in crisis, leading to renewed interest in alternative institutional designs. One popular proposal—what I call legislative sortition —says we should replace elected legislators with randomly selected citizens. While legislative sortition has drawn both numerous supporters and critics, one objection has received little attention: that ordinary citizens’ lower cognitive abilities, relative to…
Creative Destruction and the Autonomous Life
In Defense of Filibustering
The Senate filibuster is among the most criticized political institutions in the United States. This paper examines the ethics of filibustering. The way filibustering currently proceeds in the Senate, I argue, is morally indefensible. Yet, there is a way filibustering could proceed that is both defensible and desirable from a normative perspective. This is because filibustering—if it is properly institutionalized—allows minority parties in the le…
Prosecuting Politicians
This paper examines the argument that prosecutors should consider public perceptions when deciding to prosecute political figures. This was a popular argument marshalled to criticize the many prosecutions of former and current United States president Donald J. Trump. Using the tools of analytic philosophy, I construct what I think is the most compelling version of this argument. The argument is not obviously wrong but does encounter problems. I r…
Autonomy, zoning, and gentrification
Zoning severely limits what individuals can do with their private property. There is also empirical evidence that zoning contributes to the housing affordability crisis. There are good reasons to be skeptical of zoning, yet it is ubiquitous. What (if anything) can justify this widespread yet dubious practice? I critically examine one argument in this paper. The argument says zoning is justified because it facilitates autonomy. After a charitable …
Natasha Piano, Democratic Elitism: The Founding Myth of American Political Science
All a political system needs to be democratic, according to this minimal definition, is competitive elections. Where does this understanding of democracy come from? The standard story says from two Italian thinkers, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, who inspired the German Robert Michels, who inspired the Austrian Joseph Schumpeter, who brought it across the Atlantic to the United States when he took a job at Harvard
The Moral Status of Pecuniary Externalities
Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (Econ Philos 38, pp. 221–241, 2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (Philos Public Affairs 50: 202–238, 2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities…
There is no right to a competent electorate
This paper addresses the debate surrounding epistocracy. While many discussions of epistocracy focus on its instrumental defenses, this paper aims to critically examine the non-instrumental jury argument offered by Jason Brennan. Brennan’s argument equates the rights of individuals in political decisions to their rights in jury decisions, asserting that just as individuals have a right to a competent jury, they likewise have a right to a competen…
Formal models in normative political theory
This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and th…
In Defense of (Limited) Oligarchy
In democracies around the world, the rich exercise a disproportionate share of political power. Democratic theorists universally condemn this. The current paper brings balance to this conversation by mustering a defense of limited oligarchy. I have two goals. First, I shall argue that we need not be overly despondent about the wealthy's outsized influence, for overrepresentation of the wealthy performs some good for us—good which might not be ent…
In defense of knavish constitutions
Reparations to the Privileged
Many believe that we owe reparations to groups who suffered significant injustice in the past. Oftentimes, groups who suffered historical injustice are not very well off today, especially when compared to the groups who imposed the injustice on them. However, in some cases, groups who suffered historical injustice are better off today than the groups who imposed the injustice on them. Under these circumstances, ought the now‐better‐off group who …
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth
Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world's greatest philosophers and economists – such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls – thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this article. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argum…
Secret Government: The Pathologies of Publicity
Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard n…
Lockeans against labor mixing
The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of pro…
Secret Government: The Pathologies of Publicity
Secrecy and transparency in political philosophy
Political institutions can be transparent or secret. If they are transparent, then we have access to information about how agents act within them. If they are secret, then we do not have access to this information. The presence and extent of transparency has tremendous impact on how political institutions function. The purpose of this article is to offer a brief overview of what political philosophers have thus far had to say about transparency a…
Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom
This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms’ work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book’s wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to read…
Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom
This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms’ work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book’s wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to read…
Diversity and rights: A social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason
Public Reason's Chaos Theorem
Citizens in John Rawls's well-ordered society face an assurance dilemma. They wish to act justly only if they are reasonably sure their fellow citizens will also act justly. According to Rawls, this assurance problem is solved through public reasoning. This paper argues that public reason cannot serve this function. It begins by arguing that one kind of incompleteness public reason faces that most Rawlsians grant is ubiquitous but unproblematic f…
Kant, Rawls, and the Possibility of Autonomy
One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice (TJ) and Political Liberalism (PL) is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s …
The Supreme Court as the Fountain of Public Reason
The idea of public reason requires that citizens in their public deliberation employ considerations stemming from a shared conception of justice. One worry is that public reason's content will be incomplete, in that it does not contain sufficient material for adequate public debate. Rawls has a way of expanding the content of public reason to address such concerns—by including in public reason all those things you and I say in our justification o…
Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility
In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming…
When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath
Public officials in John Rawls's well-ordered society face an assurance problem. They prefer to act in accordance with the political conception of justice, but only if they are assured that others will. On Paul Weithman's influential interpretation, Rawls attempts to solve this problem by claiming that public reason is an assurance mechanism. There are several problems with Rawls's solution: Public reason talk is too cheap to facilitate assurance…
Enough and as Good: A Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation
In developing a theory of the first appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature, John Locke tells us that persons must leave “enough and as good” for others. Detailing exactly what this restriction requires divides right and left libertarians. Briefly, right libertarians interpret “enough and as good” as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the first appropriation of natural resources, whereas left libertarians interpret “…
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth
Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world's greatest philosophers and economists – such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls – thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this article. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argum…
Diversity and rights: A social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason
Formal models in normative political theory
This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and th…
Aggregating out of indeterminacy: Social choice theory to the rescue
This article explores public reason liberalism’s indeterminacy problem, a problem that obtains when we admit significant diversity into our justificatory model. The article argues first that Gerald Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem is unsatisfactory and second that, contra Gaus’s concerns, social choice theory is able to solve public reason’s indeterminacy problem. Moreover, social choice theory can do so in a way that avoids the worri…
In defense of knavish constitutions
Lockeans against labor mixing
The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of pro…
Secrecy and transparency in political philosophy
Political institutions can be transparent or secret. If they are transparent, then we have access to information about how agents act within them. If they are secret, then we do not have access to this information. The presence and extent of transparency has tremendous impact on how political institutions function. The purpose of this article is to offer a brief overview of what political philosophers have thus far had to say about transparency a…
What we choose, what we prefer
Modeling the individual for constitutional choice
Modeling the individual for constitutional choice
When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath
Public officials in John Rawls's well-ordered society face an assurance problem. They prefer to act in accordance with the political conception of justice, but only if they are assured that others will. On Paul Weithman's influential interpretation, Rawls attempts to solve this problem by claiming that public reason is an assurance mechanism. There are several problems with Rawls's solution: Public reason talk is too cheap to facilitate assurance…
Christopher Freiman: Unequivocal justice
Justice, Diversity, and The Well-Ordered Society
One unchanging feature of John Rawls’ thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. Yet, once we introduce justice pluralism—the fact that reasonable people disagree about the nature and requirements of justice, something Rawls eventually admits is inevitable in liberal societies—then a well-ordered society as Rawls defines it is impossible. This requires we develop new models of society to replace the well-ordered society in order to…
Aggregating out of indeterminacy: Social choice theory to the rescue
This article explores public reason liberalism’s indeterminacy problem, a problem that obtains when we admit significant diversity into our justificatory model. The article argues first that Gerald Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem is unsatisfactory and second that, contra Gaus’s concerns, social choice theory is able to solve public reason’s indeterminacy problem. Moreover, social choice theory can do so in a way that avoids the worri…
The Supreme Court as the Fountain of Public Reason
The idea of public reason requires that citizens in their public deliberation employ considerations stemming from a shared conception of justice. One worry is that public reason's content will be incomplete, in that it does not contain sufficient material for adequate public debate. Rawls has a way of expanding the content of public reason to address such concerns—by including in public reason all those things you and I say in our justification o…
Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility
In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming…
What we choose, what we prefer
Enough and as Good: A Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation
In developing a theory of the first appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature, John Locke tells us that persons must leave “enough and as good” for others. Detailing exactly what this restriction requires divides right and left libertarians. Briefly, right libertarians interpret “enough and as good” as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the first appropriation of natural resources, whereas left libertarians interpret “…
Public Reason's Chaos Theorem
Citizens in John Rawls's well-ordered society face an assurance dilemma. They wish to act justly only if they are reasonably sure their fellow citizens will also act justly. According to Rawls, this assurance problem is solved through public reasoning. This paper argues that public reason cannot serve this function. It begins by arguing that one kind of incompleteness public reason faces that most Rawlsians grant is ubiquitous but unproblematic f…
Kant, Rawls, and the Possibility of Autonomy
One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice (TJ) and Political Liberalism (PL) is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s …
Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom
This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms’ work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book’s wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to read…
Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom
This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms’ work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book’s wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to read…
Diversity and rights: A social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason
Secret Government: The Pathologies of Publicity
Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard n…
Lockeans against labor mixing
The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of pro…
Secret Government: The Pathologies of Publicity
Secrecy and transparency in political philosophy
Political institutions can be transparent or secret. If they are transparent, then we have access to information about how agents act within them. If they are secret, then we do not have access to this information. The presence and extent of transparency has tremendous impact on how political institutions function. The purpose of this article is to offer a brief overview of what political philosophers have thus far had to say about transparency a…
Reparations to the Privileged
Many believe that we owe reparations to groups who suffered significant injustice in the past. Oftentimes, groups who suffered historical injustice are not very well off today, especially when compared to the groups who imposed the injustice on them. However, in some cases, groups who suffered historical injustice are better off today than the groups who imposed the injustice on them. Under these circumstances, ought the now‐better‐off group who …
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth
Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world's greatest philosophers and economists – such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls – thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this article. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argum…
In Defense of (Limited) Oligarchy
In democracies around the world, the rich exercise a disproportionate share of political power. Democratic theorists universally condemn this. The current paper brings balance to this conversation by mustering a defense of limited oligarchy. I have two goals. First, I shall argue that we need not be overly despondent about the wealthy's outsized influence, for overrepresentation of the wealthy performs some good for us—good which might not be ent…
In defense of knavish constitutions
The Moral Status of Pecuniary Externalities
Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (Econ Philos 38, pp. 221–241, 2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (Philos Public Affairs 50: 202–238, 2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities…
There is no right to a competent electorate
This paper addresses the debate surrounding epistocracy. While many discussions of epistocracy focus on its instrumental defenses, this paper aims to critically examine the non-instrumental jury argument offered by Jason Brennan. Brennan’s argument equates the rights of individuals in political decisions to their rights in jury decisions, asserting that just as individuals have a right to a competent jury, they likewise have a right to a competen…
Formal models in normative political theory
This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and th…
Political science (25 works) · Law (24 works) · Sociology (23 works) · Law and economics (18 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (18 works) · Politics (17 works) · Philosophy (16 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (10 works)