Raamy Majeed
Biographic Data
| ID | 1287115 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Raamy Majeed |
| GIVEN NAMES | Raamy |
| FAMILY NAME | Majeed |
| SIGNATURE | MAJEED R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manchester |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8864-1643 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Philosophical Insights for a Science of Long-Term Affect Dynamics
Emotions in scientific research are typically portrayed as short-lived responses or dispositions to manifest such responses. Some philosophers have argued that this fails to capture long-term emotions (e.g., love, hate, and grief). This article examines whether the emerging field of affect dynamics (or emotion dynamics), which studies how emotions fluctuate over time, can address the philosophical critique. I argue that there are still aspects of…
Gunning for affective realism
Affective realism, roughly the hypothesis that you “perceive what you feel”, has recently been put forward as a novel, empirically-backed explanation of police shooting errors. The affective states involved in policing in high-pressure situations result in police officers literally seeing guns even when none are present. The aim of this paper is to (i) unpack the implications of this explanation for assessing police culpability and (ii) determine…
National Humiliation
National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this article, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, for example, to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia's invas…
On How to Develop Emotion Taxonomies
How should we go about developing emotion taxonomies suitable for a science of emotion? Scientific categories are supposed to be “projectable”: They must support generalizations required for the scientific practices of induction and explanation. Attempts to provide projectable emotion categories typically classify emotions in terms of a limited set of modules, but such taxonomies have had limited uptake because they arguably misrepresent the dive…
On Biologizing Racism
To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical intervention. In Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice, Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper …
Does the Problem of Variability Justify Barrett’s Emotion Revolution
The problem of variability concerns the fact that empirical data does not support the existence of a coordinated set of biological markers, either in the body or the brain, which correspond to our folk emotion categories; categories like anger, happiness, sadness, disgust and fear. Barrett (2006a, b, 2013, 2016, 2017a, b) employs this fact to argue (i) against the faculty psychology approach to emotion, e.g. emotions are the products of emotion-s…
The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity
The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity concerns making sense of two conflicting bodies of evidence: evidence that emotions often appear modular in key respects, and evidence that our emotions also often appear to transcend this modularity. In this paper, I argue a developmentalist approach to emotion, which builds on Karmiloff-Smith’s (1986, 1992, 1994, 2015) work on cognitive development, can help us dissolve this puzzle
What Not to Make of Recalcitrant Emotions
The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality
The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in …
The New Ledoux
LeDoux's pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths’ argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning. LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread. He argues that using emotion terms, like …
Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics
Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in ‘serious metaphysics’: roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with ‘the Canberra Plan’, a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67(13):4…
On Biologizing Racism
To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical intervention. In Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice, Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper …
Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics
Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in ‘serious metaphysics’: roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with ‘the Canberra Plan’, a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67(13):4…
The New Ledoux
LeDoux's pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths’ argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning. LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread. He argues that using emotion terms, like …
The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity
The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity concerns making sense of two conflicting bodies of evidence: evidence that emotions often appear modular in key respects, and evidence that our emotions also often appear to transcend this modularity. In this paper, I argue a developmentalist approach to emotion, which builds on Karmiloff-Smith’s (1986, 1992, 1994, 2015) work on cognitive development, can help us dissolve this puzzle
What Not to Make of Recalcitrant Emotions
The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality
The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in …
Does the Problem of Variability Justify Barrett’s Emotion Revolution
The problem of variability concerns the fact that empirical data does not support the existence of a coordinated set of biological markers, either in the body or the brain, which correspond to our folk emotion categories; categories like anger, happiness, sadness, disgust and fear. Barrett (2006a, b, 2013, 2016, 2017a, b) employs this fact to argue (i) against the faculty psychology approach to emotion, e.g. emotions are the products of emotion-s…
On How to Develop Emotion Taxonomies
How should we go about developing emotion taxonomies suitable for a science of emotion? Scientific categories are supposed to be “projectable”: They must support generalizations required for the scientific practices of induction and explanation. Attempts to provide projectable emotion categories typically classify emotions in terms of a limited set of modules, but such taxonomies have had limited uptake because they arguably misrepresent the dive…
On Biologizing Racism
To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical intervention. In Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice, Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper …
Philosophical Insights for a Science of Long-Term Affect Dynamics
Emotions in scientific research are typically portrayed as short-lived responses or dispositions to manifest such responses. Some philosophers have argued that this fails to capture long-term emotions (e.g., love, hate, and grief). This article examines whether the emerging field of affect dynamics (or emotion dynamics), which studies how emotions fluctuate over time, can address the philosophical critique. I argue that there are still aspects of…
Gunning for affective realism
Affective realism, roughly the hypothesis that you “perceive what you feel”, has recently been put forward as a novel, empirically-backed explanation of police shooting errors. The affective states involved in policing in high-pressure situations result in police officers literally seeing guns even when none are present. The aim of this paper is to (i) unpack the implications of this explanation for assessing police culpability and (ii) determine…
National Humiliation
National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this article, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, for example, to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia's invas…
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (7 works) · Social Psychology (7 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works)