Yael Loewenstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 1287580 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yael Loewenstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yael |
| FAMILY NAME | Loewenstein |
| SIGNATURE | LOEWENSTEIN Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Houston |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9512-0237 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Against the standard solution to the grandfather paradox
Morgenbesser’s Coin
Before a fair, indeterministic coin is tossed, Lucky, who is causally isolated from the coin-tossing mechanism, declines to bet on heads. The coin lands heads. The consensus is that the following counterfactual is true: (M:) If Lucky had bet heads, he would have won the bet. It is also widely believed that to rule (M) true, any plausible semantics for counterfactuals must invoke causal independence. But if that’s so, the hope of giving a reductiv…
Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified ‘Would’-Counterfactuals Are Not True
The apparent consistency of Sobel sequences (example below) famously motivated David Lewis to defend a variably strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.If Sophie had gone to the parade and had been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro.But if the order of the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence is reversed—in the example, if (b) is asserted prior to (a)—the s…
Should we be skeptics or contextualists about counterfactual conditionals
Just as knowledge contextualism offers a way out of knowledge skepticism in the face of powerful skeptical arguments, counterfactual contextualism purports to answer the many compelling arguments for the skeptical thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals of the form 'if A had happened, C would have happened', are false. In this article I review a few of the arguments for counterfactual skepticism, before surveying the various types of contextual…
No prominent works on this page.
Morgenbesser’s Coin
Before a fair, indeterministic coin is tossed, Lucky, who is causally isolated from the coin-tossing mechanism, declines to bet on heads. The coin lands heads. The consensus is that the following counterfactual is true: (M:) If Lucky had bet heads, he would have won the bet. It is also widely believed that to rule (M) true, any plausible semantics for counterfactuals must invoke causal independence. But if that’s so, the hope of giving a reductiv…
Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified ‘Would’-Counterfactuals Are Not True
The apparent consistency of Sobel sequences (example below) famously motivated David Lewis to defend a variably strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.If Sophie had gone to the parade and had been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro.But if the order of the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence is reversed—in the example, if (b) is asserted prior to (a)—the s…
Should we be skeptics or contextualists about counterfactual conditionals
Just as knowledge contextualism offers a way out of knowledge skepticism in the face of powerful skeptical arguments, counterfactual contextualism purports to answer the many compelling arguments for the skeptical thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals of the form 'if A had happened, C would have happened', are false. In this article I review a few of the arguments for counterfactual skepticism, before surveying the various types of contextual…
Against the standard solution to the grandfather paradox
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Counterfactual conditional (3 works) · Counterfactual thinking (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works)