Should we be skeptics or contextualists about counterfactual conditionals

Bibliographic Data

ID5158228
AuthorsYael Loewenstein (0000-0002-9512-0237, University of Houston, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume16
Issue10
Publication date2021-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12768
OpenAlexW3197660613
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited20

Just as knowledge contextualism offers a way out of knowledge skepticism in the face of powerful skeptical arguments, counterfactual contextualism purports to answer the many compelling arguments for the skeptical thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals of the form 'if A had happened, C would have happened', are false. In this article I review a few of the arguments for counterfactual skepticism, before surveying the various types of contextualist responses. I then discuss some of the recent objections to counterfactual contextualism, with an eye toward weighing contextualism's costs with the costs of accepting skepticism. I conclude by remarking on some of the implications that skepticism and contextualism each has for many disputes in metaphysics

Contextualism · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Linguistics · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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