Thomas Schindler
Biographic Data
| ID | 1291890 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Schindler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Schindler |
| SIGNATURE | SCHINDLER T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bristol |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2978-5409 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Unrestricted quantification and ranges of significance
Call a quantifier ‘unrestricted’ if it ranges over absolutely all objects. Arguably, unrestricted quantification is often presupposed in philosophical inquiry. However, developing a semantic theory that vindicates unrestricted quantification proves rather difficult, at least as long as we formulate our semantic theory within a classical first-order language. It has been argued that using a type theory as framework for our semantic theory provides…
Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology
I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpr…
The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth
Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts, which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize the axioms of the minimalist theo…
A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding
Horwich (Deflationism and paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 75–84, 2005) proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of grounding—one that, unlike Kripke’s (J Philos 72:690–716, 1975) notion of grounding, does not invoke any “Tarski-style compositional principles”. In this short note, we will formalize Horwich’s construction and argue that his solution to the liar paradox does not justify certain generali…
Semantic Deflationism and Meta-Ontological Deflationism
Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they …
Deflationism and the Function of Truth
Deflationism about truth is a trending cluster of claims about the meaning and the role of the truth predicate in natural language, as well as the nature of truth itself. Different versions of deflationism pick different claims as part of the core and belt of the position. The most popular version, which will be the focus of this paper, takes the two theses we describe next to constitute its core. Its most vocal contemporary advocates are Horwich…
Rechtsgeschäftliche Entscheidungsfreiheit und Drohung
Rechtsgeschäftliches Handeln beruht auf vielerlei Einflüssen. Unter welchen Voraussetzungen kann eine Rechtsordnung dem Verhandlungspartner gestatten, sich von den Rechtsfolgen seines Handelns mit der Begründung zu lösen, er sei bedroht worden? Thomas Schindler geht dieser Frage aus rechtshistorisch-rechtsvergleichender Sicht nach. Einer Erörterung der englischen »duress«-Lehre werden die Lösungen des deutschen Rechts gegenübergestellt. Auf diese…
Deflationism and the Function of Truth
Deflationism about truth is a trending cluster of claims about the meaning and the role of the truth predicate in natural language, as well as the nature of truth itself. Different versions of deflationism pick different claims as part of the core and belt of the position. The most popular version, which will be the focus of this paper, takes the two theses we describe next to constitute its core. Its most vocal contemporary advocates are Horwich…
A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding
Horwich (Deflationism and paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 75–84, 2005) proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of grounding—one that, unlike Kripke’s (J Philos 72:690–716, 1975) notion of grounding, does not invoke any “Tarski-style compositional principles”. In this short note, we will formalize Horwich’s construction and argue that his solution to the liar paradox does not justify certain generali…
Semantic Deflationism and Meta-Ontological Deflationism
Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they …
Rechtsgeschäftliche Entscheidungsfreiheit und Drohung
Rechtsgeschäftliches Handeln beruht auf vielerlei Einflüssen. Unter welchen Voraussetzungen kann eine Rechtsordnung dem Verhandlungspartner gestatten, sich von den Rechtsfolgen seines Handelns mit der Begründung zu lösen, er sei bedroht worden? Thomas Schindler geht dieser Frage aus rechtshistorisch-rechtsvergleichender Sicht nach. Einer Erörterung der englischen »duress«-Lehre werden die Lösungen des deutschen Rechts gegenübergestellt. Auf diese…
Deflationism and the Function of Truth
Deflationism about truth is a trending cluster of claims about the meaning and the role of the truth predicate in natural language, as well as the nature of truth itself. Different versions of deflationism pick different claims as part of the core and belt of the position. The most popular version, which will be the focus of this paper, takes the two theses we describe next to constitute its core. Its most vocal contemporary advocates are Horwich…
A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding
Horwich (Deflationism and paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 75–84, 2005) proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of grounding—one that, unlike Kripke’s (J Philos 72:690–716, 1975) notion of grounding, does not invoke any “Tarski-style compositional principles”. In this short note, we will formalize Horwich’s construction and argue that his solution to the liar paradox does not justify certain generali…
Semantic Deflationism and Meta-Ontological Deflationism
Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they …
The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth
Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts, which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize the axioms of the minimalist theo…
Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology
I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpr…
Unrestricted quantification and ranges of significance
Call a quantifier ‘unrestricted’ if it ranges over absolutely all objects. Arguably, unrestricted quantification is often presupposed in philosophical inquiry. However, developing a semantic theory that vindicates unrestricted quantification proves rather difficult, at least as long as we formulate our semantic theory within a classical first-order language. It has been argued that using a type theory as framework for our semantic theory provides…
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)