Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology

Bibliographic Data

ID21293678
AuthorsThomas Schindler (0000-0002-2978-5409, University of Bristol, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume100
Issue3
Pages443-458
Publication date2022-07-03
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2021.1887302
OpenAlexW3139195522
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited24

I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpressible properties, but its formulation presupposes the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. I discuss some ways to reduce these existence assumptions, but ultimately suggest that deflationists can hardly avoid quantification over abstract objects of one sort or another. I conclude that property deflationism is perhaps not as deflationary as some philosophers want it to be, but that it’s still apt to call the position ‘deflationary’

Deflation · Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Keynesian economics · Ontology · Property (philosophy) · sort · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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