Correctness conditions for property nominalists
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10814725 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arvid Båve (0000-0001-7570-2697, University of Lisbon, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 201 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-14 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-023-04206-2 |
| OpenAlex | W4380685320 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
Nominalists need some account of correctness for sentences committed to the existence of abstract objects. This paper proposes a new statement of such conditions specifically for properties. The account builds on an earlier proposal of mine, but avoids the counter-examples against the latter pointed out by Thomas Schindler, particularly, the sentence ‘There are inexpressible properties’. I argue that the new proposal is independently motivated and more faithful to the spirit of the kind of error-theoretic nominalism that the original proposal was part of. Along the way, I also propose novel treatments of Arthur Pap’s and W.V.O. Quine’s notoriously hard-to-paraphrase sentences about abstracta
Calculus (dental) · Correctness · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Nominalism · Paraphrase · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Programming language · Property (philosophy) · Quine · Sentence · Statement (logic) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
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