Ontological Commitment1
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079028 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Agustín Rayo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 428-444 |
| Publication date | 2007-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00080.x |
| OpenAlex | W4235683443 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 24 |
The paper has two main objectives. On the one hand, I offer an elucidation of the notion of ontological commitment. On the other, I assess the adequacy of criteria of ontological commitment for different languages. The paper ends with some speculative remarks about the significance of ontological commitment
Epistemology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment
The Paradox of Fictional Creatures
Avoiding Moral Commitment
True by Default
Semanticism and Ontological Commitment
Folk-Ontological Stances Towards Robots and Psychological Human Likeness
Abstract Singular Terms and Thin Reference
On Specifying Truth-Conditions
Correctness conditions for property nominalists
Manyism as mereologicism
Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties
Implicit commitment in theory choice
Paraphrase Strategies in Metaphysics
What does "nothing over and above its parts" actually mean
Towards Non-Being
To Be is to be a Value of a Variable (or to be Some Values of Some Variables)
Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase
Deflating Existential Consequence
Philosophy of Logic
Essence and Modality
Ontology and the Theory of Meaning
Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic
On What There is Not
Believing in Things
Ontology and ideology
| Citations per year | 0.78 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Highly cited | No |