Arvid Båve
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910922 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arvid Båve |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arvid |
| FAMILY NAME | Båve |
| SIGNATURE | BÅVE A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7570-2697 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Deflationism and propositional quantification
The paper first discusses a general argument against Horwich's Minimal Theory of Truth, relating to its infinitary character, and then discusses his argument against using propositional quantifiers to generalize over the truth schema instances. On the most charitable interpretation, the argument holds that there is a contradiction between the use of such quantifiers and a typical deflationist idea about the function of the truth predicate. It tur…
Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties
Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, i…
Correctness conditions for property nominalists
Nominalists need some account of correctness for sentences committed to the existence of abstract objects. This paper proposes a new statement of such conditions specifically for properties. The account builds on an earlier proposal of mine, but avoids the counter-examples against the latter pointed out by Thomas Schindler, particularly, the sentence ‘There are inexpressible properties’. I argue that the new proposal is independently motivated an…
Problems for Russellian act-type theories
I here discuss two problems facing act-type theories of propositions, and argue that Fregean act-type theories are better equipped to deal with them than Russellian ones. The first relates to complex singular terms like '2+2', which turn out not to pose any special problem for Fregeans at all, whereas Soames' Russellian theory currently has no satisfactory way of dealing with them (particularly, with such ‘mixed’ propositions as the proposition t…
Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism
It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are indep…
Formulating deflationism
Compositional Semantics for Expressivists
I here propose a hitherto unnoticed possibility of solving embedding problems for noncognitivist expressivists in metaethics by appeal to Conceptual Role Semantics. I show that claims from the latter as to what constitutes various concepts can be used to define functions from states expressed by atomic sentences to states expressed by complex sentences, thereby allowing an expressivist semantics that satisfies a rather strict compositionality con…
Deflationism and the primary truth bearer
A deflationary theory of reference
Meaning as a Normative Concept
Meaning as a Normative Concept
A deflationary theory of reference
Deflationism and the primary truth bearer
Formulating deflationism
Compositional Semantics for Expressivists
I here propose a hitherto unnoticed possibility of solving embedding problems for noncognitivist expressivists in metaethics by appeal to Conceptual Role Semantics. I show that claims from the latter as to what constitutes various concepts can be used to define functions from states expressed by atomic sentences to states expressed by complex sentences, thereby allowing an expressivist semantics that satisfies a rather strict compositionality con…
Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism
It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are indep…
Problems for Russellian act-type theories
I here discuss two problems facing act-type theories of propositions, and argue that Fregean act-type theories are better equipped to deal with them than Russellian ones. The first relates to complex singular terms like '2+2', which turn out not to pose any special problem for Fregeans at all, whereas Soames' Russellian theory currently has no satisfactory way of dealing with them (particularly, with such ‘mixed’ propositions as the proposition t…
Correctness conditions for property nominalists
Nominalists need some account of correctness for sentences committed to the existence of abstract objects. This paper proposes a new statement of such conditions specifically for properties. The account builds on an earlier proposal of mine, but avoids the counter-examples against the latter pointed out by Thomas Schindler, particularly, the sentence ‘There are inexpressible properties’. I argue that the new proposal is independently motivated an…
Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties
Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, i…
Deflationism and propositional quantification
The paper first discusses a general argument against Horwich's Minimal Theory of Truth, relating to its infinitary character, and then discusses his argument against using propositional quantifiers to generalize over the truth schema instances. On the most charitable interpretation, the argument holds that there is a contradiction between the use of such quantifiers and a typical deflationist idea about the function of the truth predicate. It tur…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works)