Deflationism and propositional quantification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335006 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arvid Båve (0000-0001-7570-2697, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-16 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-11 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2025.2514019 |
| OpenAlex | W4411252137 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
The paper first discusses a general argument against Horwich's Minimal Theory of Truth, relating to its infinitary character, and then discusses his argument against using propositional quantifiers to generalize over the truth schema instances. On the most charitable interpretation, the argument holds that there is a contradiction between the use of such quantifiers and a typical deflationist idea about the function of the truth predicate. It turns out, however, that although for the cast majority of cases in which propositional quantifiers could be used in a theory, his argument works, but not for the special case of truth theories. I then consider some other common worries about using propositional quantifiers to formulate a truth theory and find them all wanting. An upshot of this investigation, however, is that it seems to be indeterminate, among several formulations of a deflationist truth theory, which one is “the right one”. I conclude that this conclusion is not necessarily unacceptable, and may even be one that should endorsed by deflationists, as it coheres with the “fundamental deflationist intuition”, that all there is to say about truth is that the proposition that snow is white is true if snow is white, and so on
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|