Marc Champagne
Biographic Data
| ID | 1293964 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marc Champagne |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marc |
| FAMILY NAME | Champagne |
| SIGNATURE | CHAMPAGNE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9841-7538 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm
A Pragmatic-Semiotic Defence of Bivalence
Since Peirce defined the first operators for three-valued logic, it is usually assumed that he rejected the principle of bivalence. However, I argue that, because bivalence is a principle, the strategy used by Peirce to defend logical principles can be used to defend bivalence. Construing logic as the study of substitutions of equivalent representations, Peirce showed that some patterns of substitution get realized in the very act of questioning …
The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility
Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgas…
Diagrams and alien ways of thinking
Peat Bogs, Sperm, and Family Values
Brandom, Peirce, and the overlooked friction of contrapiction
Bridging the Responsibility Gap in Automated Warfare
A less simplistic metaphysics
This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual signaction (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be …
Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. Whi…
One’s a Crowd? On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social
In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the re…
A necessary condition for proof of abiotic semiosis
This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less careful inquiries into "physiosemiosis." It is emphasized that, in order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have to be abiotic (that is, not dependent on a living organism). Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a natural sign (l…
Axiomatizing umwelt normativity
Prompted by the thesis that an organism's umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disva…
Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal-consciousness" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in qu…
Axiomatizing umwelt normativity
Prompted by the thesis that an organism's umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disva…
A less simplistic metaphysics
This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual signaction (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be …
Brandom, Peirce, and the overlooked friction of contrapiction
Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. Whi…
One’s a Crowd? On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social
In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the re…
Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal-consciousness" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in qu…
Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal-consciousness" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in qu…
Axiomatizing umwelt normativity
Prompted by the thesis that an organism's umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disva…
One’s a Crowd? On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social
In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the re…
A necessary condition for proof of abiotic semiosis
This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less careful inquiries into "physiosemiosis." It is emphasized that, in order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have to be abiotic (that is, not dependent on a living organism). Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a natural sign (l…
Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. Whi…
Bridging the Responsibility Gap in Automated Warfare
A less simplistic metaphysics
This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual signaction (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be …
Peat Bogs, Sperm, and Family Values
Brandom, Peirce, and the overlooked friction of contrapiction
Diagrams and alien ways of thinking
The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility
Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgas…
A Pragmatic-Semiotic Defence of Bivalence
Since Peirce defined the first operators for three-valued logic, it is usually assumed that he rejected the principle of bivalence. However, I argue that, because bivalence is a principle, the strategy used by Peirce to defend logical principles can be used to defend bivalence. Construing logic as the study of substitutions of equivalent representations, Peirce showed that some patterns of substitution get realized in the very act of questioning …
A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 works)