A Pragmatic-Semiotic Defence of Bivalence

Bibliographic Data

ID21451228
AuthorsMarc Champagne (0000-0002-9841-7538, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume43
Issue2
Pages143-157
Publication date2022-04-03
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory and Philosophy of Logic (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0144-5340 • E-ISSN: 1464-5149
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01445340.2021.1924570
OpenAlexW3172612205
LanguageEN
References cited39

Since Peirce defined the first operators for three-valued logic, it is usually assumed that he rejected the principle of bivalence. However, I argue that, because bivalence is a principle, the strategy used by Peirce to defend logical principles can be used to defend bivalence. Construing logic as the study of substitutions of equivalent representations, Peirce showed that some patterns of substitution get realized in the very act of questioning them. While I recognize that we can devise non-classical notations, I argue that, when we make claims about those notations, we inevitably get saddled with bivalent commitments. I present several simple inferences to show this. The argument that results from those examples is ‘pragmatic’, because the inevitability of the principle is revealed in use (not mention); and it is ‘semiotic’, because this revelation happens in the use of signs

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Intuitionistic logic · Linguistics · Notation · Propositional calculus · Semiotics · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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