Herman Veluwenkamp
Biographic Data
| ID | 1307064 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Herman Veluwenkamp |
| GIVEN NAMES | Herman |
| FAMILY NAME | Veluwenkamp |
| SIGNATURE | VELUWENKAMP H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1783-459X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
How to do conceptual ethics
Conceptual ethics asks which concepts we should use and why. We develop a framework for evaluating the normative reasons that should guide such choices. We identify three problems in the literature: (i) treating conceptual ethics as special in a way that requires domain-specific internalism about reasons; (ii) defining functions in purely descriptive terms, which fails to explain their normative significance; and (iii) letting function crowd out …
Impactful Conceptual Engineering
Conceptual engineering is the design, evaluation and implementation of concepts. Despite its popularity, some have argued that the methodology is not worthwhile, because the implementation of new concepts is both inscrutable and beyond our control. In the recent literature we see different responses to this worry. Some have argued that it is for political reasons just as well that implementation is such a difficult task, while others have challen…
Conceptual ethics and the ethics of implementation
Recent years have seen increasing attention to conceptual engineering, the enterprise of evaluating and improving our repertoire of representational devices (e.g., words, concepts, classificatory procedures). This paper contributes to the systematic investigation of the normative questions that arise within and about conceptual engineering. It does two things. First, it argues for a clear distinction between two normative domains that are often c…
Proper foundations for conceptual ethics
Conceptual ethics asks which concepts we ought to use. Matthieu Queloz’s recent book, The Ethics of Conceptualization , offers the most developed account to date. He argues that reasons for concept choice should be grounded in our conceptual needs, which he understands as reflectively endorsed concerns, capacities, and circumstances. His case proceeds through a two-tier argument that rejects foundationalism, ironism, and holism, as well as approa…
What responsibility gaps are and what they should be
Responsibility gaps traditionally refer to scenarios in which no one is responsible for harm caused by artificial agents, such as autonomous machines or collective agents. By carefully examining the different ways this concept has been defined in the social ontology and ethics of technology literature, I argue that our current concept of responsibility gaps is defective. To address this conceptual flaw, I argue that the concept of responsibility …
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, an…
Artificial agents
Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present m…
Design for values and conceptual engineering
The risks of autonomous machines
Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The worry has been that, because they are artificial agents, it is impossible to attribute blame, even though doing so would be appropriate given the harms they cause. We argue that there are no responsibility gaps. The harms can be blameless. And if they are not, the blame that is appropriate is indirect and can be attributed to designers, engineers, so…
Reasons for Meaningful Human Control
”Meaningful human control” is a term invented in the political and legal debate on autonomous weapons system, but it is nowadays also used in many other contexts. It is supposed to specify conditions under which an artificial system is under the right kind of control to avoid responsibility gaps: that is, situations in which no moral agent is responsible. Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven have recently suggested a framework that can be used by sys…
Technology as Driver for Morally Motivated Conceptual Engineering
New technologies are the source of uncertainties about the applicability of moral and morally connotated concepts. These uncertainties sometimes call for conceptual engineering, but it is not often recognized when this is the case. We take this to be a missed opportunity, as a recognition that different researchers are working on the same kind of project can help solve methodological questions that one is likely to encounter. In this paper, we pr…
Inferentialist Truth Pluralism
Metasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions o…
The risks of autonomous machines
Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The worry has been that, because they are artificial agents, it is impossible to attribute blame, even though doing so would be appropriate given the harms they cause. We argue that there are no responsibility gaps. The harms can be blameless. And if they are not, the blame that is appropriate is indirect and can be attributed to designers, engineers, so…
What responsibility gaps are and what they should be
Responsibility gaps traditionally refer to scenarios in which no one is responsible for harm caused by artificial agents, such as autonomous machines or collective agents. By carefully examining the different ways this concept has been defined in the social ontology and ethics of technology literature, I argue that our current concept of responsibility gaps is defective. To address this conceptual flaw, I argue that the concept of responsibility …
Inferentialist Truth Pluralism
Metasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions o…
Reasons for Meaningful Human Control
”Meaningful human control” is a term invented in the political and legal debate on autonomous weapons system, but it is nowadays also used in many other contexts. It is supposed to specify conditions under which an artificial system is under the right kind of control to avoid responsibility gaps: that is, situations in which no moral agent is responsible. Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven have recently suggested a framework that can be used by sys…
Technology as Driver for Morally Motivated Conceptual Engineering
New technologies are the source of uncertainties about the applicability of moral and morally connotated concepts. These uncertainties sometimes call for conceptual engineering, but it is not often recognized when this is the case. We take this to be a missed opportunity, as a recognition that different researchers are working on the same kind of project can help solve methodological questions that one is likely to encounter. In this paper, we pr…
Design for values and conceptual engineering
The risks of autonomous machines
Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The worry has been that, because they are artificial agents, it is impossible to attribute blame, even though doing so would be appropriate given the harms they cause. We argue that there are no responsibility gaps. The harms can be blameless. And if they are not, the blame that is appropriate is indirect and can be attributed to designers, engineers, so…
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, an…
Artificial agents
Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present m…
Impactful Conceptual Engineering
Conceptual engineering is the design, evaluation and implementation of concepts. Despite its popularity, some have argued that the methodology is not worthwhile, because the implementation of new concepts is both inscrutable and beyond our control. In the recent literature we see different responses to this worry. Some have argued that it is for political reasons just as well that implementation is such a difficult task, while others have challen…
Conceptual ethics and the ethics of implementation
Recent years have seen increasing attention to conceptual engineering, the enterprise of evaluating and improving our repertoire of representational devices (e.g., words, concepts, classificatory procedures). This paper contributes to the systematic investigation of the normative questions that arise within and about conceptual engineering. It does two things. First, it argues for a clear distinction between two normative domains that are often c…
Proper foundations for conceptual ethics
Conceptual ethics asks which concepts we ought to use. Matthieu Queloz’s recent book, The Ethics of Conceptualization , offers the most developed account to date. He argues that reasons for concept choice should be grounded in our conceptual needs, which he understands as reflectively endorsed concerns, capacities, and circumstances. His case proceeds through a two-tier argument that rejects foundationalism, ironism, and holism, as well as approa…
What responsibility gaps are and what they should be
Responsibility gaps traditionally refer to scenarios in which no one is responsible for harm caused by artificial agents, such as autonomous machines or collective agents. By carefully examining the different ways this concept has been defined in the social ontology and ethics of technology literature, I argue that our current concept of responsibility gaps is defective. To address this conceptual flaw, I argue that the concept of responsibility …
How to do conceptual ethics
Conceptual ethics asks which concepts we should use and why. We develop a framework for evaluating the normative reasons that should guide such choices. We identify three problems in the literature: (i) treating conceptual ethics as special in a way that requires domain-specific internalism about reasons; (ii) defining functions in purely descriptive terms, which fails to explain their normative significance; and (iii) letting function crowd out …
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Conceptual framework (5 works) · Engineering (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (5 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (5 works) · Engineering ethics (4 works)