Alkis Kotsonis
Biographic Data
| ID | 1307730 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alkis Kotsonis |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alkis |
| FAMILY NAME | Kotsonis |
| SIGNATURE | KOTSONIS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Edinburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2097-2627 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Silos of the Mind
Philosophy lags behind the social sciences and life sciences in terms of interdisciplinary co-authorship, with 2024 data showing that about one paper in six by philosophers can be classified as interdisciplinary, compared with one in three (or more) in the life and social sciences (OpenAlex, 2025).Footnote1 This paper examines how four key epistemic vices: (i) closed-mindedness, (ii) insouciance, (iii) arrogance, and (iv) complacent incuriosity m…
Locus of control differentiation as intellectual virtue
Self-inflicted epistemic injustice
Epistemic injustice is commonly defined as a wrong done to a person or social group in their capacity as knowers by another party. This paper seeks to draw the attention of scholars working in social epistemology to the as-yet not fully explored phenomenon of self-inflicted epistemic injustice. I propose that it is possible for a person or social group to inflict an epistemic injustice on themselves, which I term agent self-inflicted epistemic in…
Re‐examining the ancient roots of the concept of intellectual virtue
Contemporary scholars working in virtue epistemology profess to take inspiration and build on the ancient Greek conception of intellectual virtues. In this paper, I show that, despite their claim, contemporary models of intellectual virtue differ in notable ways from the ancient Greek account of the concept. I pinpoint two major differences between the ancient Greek conception of intellectual virtues and the contemporary understandings of the ter…
Why empathy is an intellectual virtue
Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellectual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epistemic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to engage in empathy. Af…
The harms of unattainable pedagogical exemplars on social media
This paper scrutinizes the nature and scope of deleterious consequences arising from the pursuit of unattainable pedagogical exemplars on social media. We cash out this phenomenon using exemplarist theory to emphasize the fact that social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, TikTok) are platforms in which the vast majority of users present idealized and curated versions of themselves. We focus specifically on educational practitioners and show that …
Epistemic Vice Rehabilitation
This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via…
On the Intellectual Vice of Epistemic Apathy
Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. Following the motivational viewpoint on vice, we conclude that epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations. The apathetic agent possesses bad (or, at least, …
Carving at the Joints
This paper examines the relatively underexplored relationship between epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms in the context of epistemic injustice. Does the presence of one always imply the presence of the other? Or, is it possible to have one without the other? Here we aim to establish a prima facie case that epistemic wrongs do not always produce epistemic harms. We argue that the epistemic wrongness of an action should never be evaluated solely …
Epistemic Collaborativeness as an Intellectual Virtue
Plato’s legacy to education
Building on Jonas and Nakazawa’s recent work (A Platonic Theory of Moral Education), my aim in this paper is to address two widespread misunderstandings of Plato’s ideas about education. The first is that the Platonic theory of education is nonegalitarian, promoting an educational system that justifies and perpetuates a caste-based society. The second is that the Platonic conception of the virtuous agent is primitive and far inferior to the Arist…
The Aristotelian understanding of intellectual vice
Contemporary scholars working in vice epistemology attribute a motivational approach to the Aristotelian understanding of intellectual vice. My aim in this article is to show that this is not an accurate interpretation of the Aristotelian position. Toward this end, I discuss Aristotle's account of the intellectual virtues of (a) intelligence and (b) comprehension as well as their corresponding vices. In opposition to the claims of several contemp…
Social media as inadvertent educators
My aim in this paper is to examine the epistemic habits that agents develop through frequent social media usage. I point out that extensive social media usage is conducive to the development of closed-mindedness and unreflective thinking and accordingly argue that social media act as inadvertent educators of epistemic vices. I contend that understanding social media as generators of epistemic dispositions is of significant import to intellectual …
Educating for Collaboration
Given the instrumental value of good collaborations for societal flourishing, educating for good collaborators (viz., agents who have the motivation and ability to collaborate with others) should be one of the fundamental goals of contemporary education. Still, fostering the growth of dispositions needed for successful collaborations is not explicitly considered to be a first-rate pedagogical goal in most contemporary virtue education programs. T…
A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice
My aim in this paper is to present and discuss a novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. I highlight that epistemic vice such as excessive curiosity, gossip and excessive inquisitiveness do not obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge and are not characterized by a deficiency of epistemic desires or vicious epistemic motivations. However, I argue that such traits ought to be classified as epistemic vices beca…
Epistemic exploitation in education
‘Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalised knowers to educate them [and others] about the nature of their oppression’ (Berenstain, 2016 Berenstain, N. (2016). Epistemic exploitation. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 3, 569–590.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 569). This paper scrutinizes some of the purported wrongs underpinning this practice, so that educators might be better equipp…
On the Platonic pedagogical methodology
My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cultivation as a worthy alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education. I highlight that, in contrast to Aristotle’s limited remarks concerning virtue education, Plato conceptualizes and develops a rigorous educational theory in the Republic that con…
Moral Exemplarism as a Powerful Indoctrinating Tool
The prominent role of education in the Platonic account of imperfect political systems
My aim in this paper is to draw the attention of educational theorists to the pedagogical arguments that Plato puts forward in his account of imperfect political systems (Republic, VIII and IX)—viz. his discussion of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. I present Plato's account of political systems and argue that the educational arguments found in this section of the Republic can be of notable merit for contemporary virtue education for …
The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues
Several contemporary virtue scholars (e.g. Zagzebski in Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Kvanvig in The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1992) trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications sho…
On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism
What can we learn from Plato about intellectual character education
In the Republic, Plato developed an educational program through which he trained young Athenians in desiring truth, without offering them any knowledge-education. This is not because he refused to pass on knowledge but because he considered knowledge of the Good as an ongoing research program. I show this by tracing the steps of the education of the Philosopher-Kings in Plato’s ideal state, to establish that the decades-long educational regime ai…
Carving at the Joints
This paper examines the relatively underexplored relationship between epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms in the context of epistemic injustice. Does the presence of one always imply the presence of the other? Or, is it possible to have one without the other? Here we aim to establish a prima facie case that epistemic wrongs do not always produce epistemic harms. We argue that the epistemic wrongness of an action should never be evaluated solely …
Epistemic exploitation in education
‘Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalised knowers to educate them [and others] about the nature of their oppression’ (Berenstain, 2016 Berenstain, N. (2016). Epistemic exploitation. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 3, 569–590.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 569). This paper scrutinizes some of the purported wrongs underpinning this practice, so that educators might be better equipp…
What can we learn from Plato about intellectual character education
In the Republic, Plato developed an educational program through which he trained young Athenians in desiring truth, without offering them any knowledge-education. This is not because he refused to pass on knowledge but because he considered knowledge of the Good as an ongoing research program. I show this by tracing the steps of the education of the Philosopher-Kings in Plato’s ideal state, to establish that the decades-long educational regime ai…
A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice
My aim in this paper is to present and discuss a novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. I highlight that epistemic vice such as excessive curiosity, gossip and excessive inquisitiveness do not obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge and are not characterized by a deficiency of epistemic desires or vicious epistemic motivations. However, I argue that such traits ought to be classified as epistemic vices beca…
The prominent role of education in the Platonic account of imperfect political systems
My aim in this paper is to draw the attention of educational theorists to the pedagogical arguments that Plato puts forward in his account of imperfect political systems (Republic, VIII and IX)—viz. his discussion of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. I present Plato's account of political systems and argue that the educational arguments found in this section of the Republic can be of notable merit for contemporary virtue education for …
The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues
Several contemporary virtue scholars (e.g. Zagzebski in Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Kvanvig in The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1992) trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications sho…
What can we learn from Plato about intellectual character education
In the Republic, Plato developed an educational program through which he trained young Athenians in desiring truth, without offering them any knowledge-education. This is not because he refused to pass on knowledge but because he considered knowledge of the Good as an ongoing research program. I show this by tracing the steps of the education of the Philosopher-Kings in Plato’s ideal state, to establish that the decades-long educational regime ai…
On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism
On the Platonic pedagogical methodology
My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cultivation as a worthy alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education. I highlight that, in contrast to Aristotle’s limited remarks concerning virtue education, Plato conceptualizes and develops a rigorous educational theory in the Republic that con…
Moral Exemplarism as a Powerful Indoctrinating Tool
The prominent role of education in the Platonic account of imperfect political systems
My aim in this paper is to draw the attention of educational theorists to the pedagogical arguments that Plato puts forward in his account of imperfect political systems (Republic, VIII and IX)—viz. his discussion of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. I present Plato's account of political systems and argue that the educational arguments found in this section of the Republic can be of notable merit for contemporary virtue education for …
The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues
Several contemporary virtue scholars (e.g. Zagzebski in Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Kvanvig in The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1992) trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications sho…
The Aristotelian understanding of intellectual vice
Contemporary scholars working in vice epistemology attribute a motivational approach to the Aristotelian understanding of intellectual vice. My aim in this article is to show that this is not an accurate interpretation of the Aristotelian position. Toward this end, I discuss Aristotle's account of the intellectual virtues of (a) intelligence and (b) comprehension as well as their corresponding vices. In opposition to the claims of several contemp…
Social media as inadvertent educators
My aim in this paper is to examine the epistemic habits that agents develop through frequent social media usage. I point out that extensive social media usage is conducive to the development of closed-mindedness and unreflective thinking and accordingly argue that social media act as inadvertent educators of epistemic vices. I contend that understanding social media as generators of epistemic dispositions is of significant import to intellectual …
Educating for Collaboration
Given the instrumental value of good collaborations for societal flourishing, educating for good collaborators (viz., agents who have the motivation and ability to collaborate with others) should be one of the fundamental goals of contemporary education. Still, fostering the growth of dispositions needed for successful collaborations is not explicitly considered to be a first-rate pedagogical goal in most contemporary virtue education programs. T…
A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice
My aim in this paper is to present and discuss a novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. I highlight that epistemic vice such as excessive curiosity, gossip and excessive inquisitiveness do not obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge and are not characterized by a deficiency of epistemic desires or vicious epistemic motivations. However, I argue that such traits ought to be classified as epistemic vices beca…
Epistemic exploitation in education
‘Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalised knowers to educate them [and others] about the nature of their oppression’ (Berenstain, 2016 Berenstain, N. (2016). Epistemic exploitation. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 3, 569–590.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 569). This paper scrutinizes some of the purported wrongs underpinning this practice, so that educators might be better equipp…
Epistemic Collaborativeness as an Intellectual Virtue
Plato’s legacy to education
Building on Jonas and Nakazawa’s recent work (A Platonic Theory of Moral Education), my aim in this paper is to address two widespread misunderstandings of Plato’s ideas about education. The first is that the Platonic theory of education is nonegalitarian, promoting an educational system that justifies and perpetuates a caste-based society. The second is that the Platonic conception of the virtuous agent is primitive and far inferior to the Arist…
Why empathy is an intellectual virtue
Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellectual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epistemic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to engage in empathy. Af…
The harms of unattainable pedagogical exemplars on social media
This paper scrutinizes the nature and scope of deleterious consequences arising from the pursuit of unattainable pedagogical exemplars on social media. We cash out this phenomenon using exemplarist theory to emphasize the fact that social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, TikTok) are platforms in which the vast majority of users present idealized and curated versions of themselves. We focus specifically on educational practitioners and show that …
Epistemic Vice Rehabilitation
This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via…
On the Intellectual Vice of Epistemic Apathy
Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. Following the motivational viewpoint on vice, we conclude that epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations. The apathetic agent possesses bad (or, at least, …
Carving at the Joints
This paper examines the relatively underexplored relationship between epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms in the context of epistemic injustice. Does the presence of one always imply the presence of the other? Or, is it possible to have one without the other? Here we aim to establish a prima facie case that epistemic wrongs do not always produce epistemic harms. We argue that the epistemic wrongness of an action should never be evaluated solely …
Self-inflicted epistemic injustice
Epistemic injustice is commonly defined as a wrong done to a person or social group in their capacity as knowers by another party. This paper seeks to draw the attention of scholars working in social epistemology to the as-yet not fully explored phenomenon of self-inflicted epistemic injustice. I propose that it is possible for a person or social group to inflict an epistemic injustice on themselves, which I term agent self-inflicted epistemic in…
Re‐examining the ancient roots of the concept of intellectual virtue
Contemporary scholars working in virtue epistemology profess to take inspiration and build on the ancient Greek conception of intellectual virtues. In this paper, I show that, despite their claim, contemporary models of intellectual virtue differ in notable ways from the ancient Greek account of the concept. I pinpoint two major differences between the ancient Greek conception of intellectual virtues and the contemporary understandings of the ter…
Silos of the Mind
Philosophy lags behind the social sciences and life sciences in terms of interdisciplinary co-authorship, with 2024 data showing that about one paper in six by philosophers can be classified as interdisciplinary, compared with one in three (or more) in the life and social sciences (OpenAlex, 2025).Footnote1 This paper examines how four key epistemic vices: (i) closed-mindedness, (ii) insouciance, (iii) arrogance, and (iv) complacent incuriosity m…
Locus of control differentiation as intellectual virtue
Epistemology (20 works) · Philosophy (17 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 works) · Virtue (10 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Social Psychology (7 works) · Epistemic virtue (6 works)