Tomáš Marvan
Biographic Data
| ID | 1308419 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tomáš Marvan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tomáš |
| FAMILY NAME | Marvan |
| SIGNATURE | MARVAN T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8487-5394 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
Was Wegner rejecting mental causality
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry
Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness
There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distingu…
Is Rorty a linguistic idealist
The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this…
No prominent works on this page.
Is Rorty a linguistic idealist
The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this…
Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness
There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distingu…
Was Wegner rejecting mental causality
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry
Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Unconscious mind (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Action Observation and Synchronization (1 work) · Agency (philosophy) (1 work)